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Abstract 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major American cities started 
aggressively deploying pedestrian stops and frisks in response to escalating 
violent crime rates. Today, high-volume use of “stop, question and frisk,” or 
“SQF,” is an acute point of friction between urban police and minority residents. 
In numerous cities, recent consent decrees or settlements have imposed Fourth 
Amendment and Equal Protections constraints on police. But do these 
constitutional rules adequately respond to the harms of SQF? This Article argues 
that the core moral objection to SQF does not track the Constitution’s focus upon 
the evidentiary sufficiency of stops or the racial animus of individual officers. I 
develop instead a new account of the distinctive wrong of aggressive street 
policing that is not contingent on individual animus or fault. This alternative 
account turns on the manner in which such policing can reproduce social and 
racial stratification. To substantiate this, I present a detailed analysis of the costs 
and benefits of SQF, with careful attention to its ecological spillovers and 
dynamic, intergenerational effects. Having explained why constitutional law, 
given its narrow transactional frame, is disarmed from an effective response, I 
present the alternative lens that is constitutionally and legally available for 
diagnosing harmful forms of urban street policing. This draws from the disparate 
impact framework of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and certain states’ laws. 
While an imprecise fit, disparate impact is legally feasible and readily available. 
To show that it is workable, I sketch three lines of econometric analysis capable 
of identifying an especially troubling subclass of racial disparate impacts in 
urban street policing.  
 
 
                                                
 *. Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Disclosure: I am on the 
board of the ACLU of Illinois, and have been closely involved in their work on stop-and-frisk. This article, however, 
reflects solely my own views and is only based on publicly available information. My thanks to John Rappaport and 
David Sklansky for helpful comments and conversation. 
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Introduction 
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major American cities started aggressively 
deploying pedestrian stops and body searches in response to escalating violent crime rates.1 The 
programmatic deployment of “stop and frisk” or “stop, question and frisk” (“SQF”) in New 
York,2 Chicago,3 Philadelphia,4 and other major cities5 involved large numbers of street stops 
and frisks, often concentrated in a handful of minority neighborhoods. Given the volume of 
individuals stopped, SQF likely became the modal form of police-citizen contact for some 
residents. Between May and August 2014, for example, police in Chicago stopped more than 
250,000 people—which translates as 93.6 stops per 1,000 inhabitants.6 In Philadelphia, police 
have stopped between 215,000 and 253,000 people per year since 2009.7 In Baltimore, the 
Department of Justice estimates, roughly 412,000 people were stopped in 2013.8 At its peak in 
2011, New York’s SQF policy generated more than 685,724 stops per year.9 Between 2004 and 
2013, that city’s inhabitants experienced roughly five million street stops.10  
 
Given the sheer scale of this intrusion into citizens’ daily lives, it is hardly surprising that 
SQF would provoke sharp controversy. Sharp-elbowed debate has ensued as to whether African-
Americans and Hispanics are being inappropriately stopped and searched.11 In addition to 
catalyzing a wider national argument about race and policing,12 SQF has sparked large-scale 
public protests,13 mayoral campaigns,14 threats to sue,15 and litigation itself. In the wake of legal 
                                                
1 Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 337 (2014) 
[hereinafter “Meares, Law and Social Science”] 
2 Id. at 337; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing early 
history of SQF in new York City). 
3 Elliott Ramos, Poor data keeps Chicago's stop and frisk hidden from scrutiny, WBEZ.org (Sept. 12, 2013) 
http://www.wbez.org/news/poor-data-keeps-chicagos-stop-and-frisk-hidden-scrutiny-108670 (describing use of stop 
and frisk in Chicago, but noting absence of sound record-keeping). 
4 See, e.g., Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, with Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A11. 
5 Laird Harrison, Oakland Police Consultant Defends ‘Stop, Ask and Frisk,’ KQED NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:38 
AM), http:// blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/02/25/oakland-police-consultant-defends-stop-ask-and-frisk. (discussing 
SQF policies in Los Angeles and Oakland). 
6 ACLU of Illinois, Stop and Frisk in Chicago 11 (March 2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [hereinafter “Stop and Frisk in Chicago”]. Because many 
individuals were stopped more than once, the effect of the policy was even more concentrated.  
7 David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 378 (2014). 
8 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of Baltimore City Police Department 23 (Aug, 10, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download.  
9 N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, Stop-and-Frisk 2012, at 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf. 
10 Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015). 
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of 
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309, 312-14 (Stephen K. Rice 
& Michael D. White eds., 2010) (documenting disparities in stops in the New York context); Stop and Frisk in 
Chicago, supra note 6, at 11 (same for Chicago). 
12 For a snapshot of that debate, see Julie Bloom et al., Baton Rouge Shooting Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jul. 18, 2016, at A1. 
13 John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently to Protest Stop-and-Frisk Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June 
18, 2012, at A15. 
14 Khorri Atkinson, Mayor de Blasio to Reform Stop-and-Frisk, AMSTERDAM NEWS, Feb. 6, 2014, 12:50 AM, http:// 
amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/feb/06/mayor-de-blasio-reform-stop-and-frisk/. 
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challenges, settlements or consent decrees regulating the use of street stops have been reached in 
the past few years in several cities. In the last year or so, New York,16 Chicago,17 Philadelphia,18 
Cincinnati19 , New Orleans, 20 Seattle,21  Baltimore,22 Cleveland,23 and Newark24 all have all 
entered into such decrees. Two cities, Boston and Oakland, did not wait for litigation, but 
engaged expert consultants, who in both cases isolated evidence of racial discrimination in street 
policing.25  
 
The debate over SQF is heated in part because of disagreement about how the core moral 
wrong of intensive street policing (if one exists) should be conceived. The legal framework 
employed by many of the aforementioned settlements and consent decrees is modeled on a body 
of black-letter constitutional doctrine that is relentlessly focused on the motivations and beliefs 
of specific, individual officers. For example, in New York, the case of Floyd v New York (which 
has yielded the only judicial decision on SQF) focused first on the Supreme Court’s 1968 
decision Terry v. Ohio, which held that officers need “reasonable articulable suspicion” of 
criminality to make a nonconsensual street-stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment.26 Then, 
citing the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, the Floyd court 
held that plaintiffs had to show that SQF not only had a racially disparate effect, but had been 
                                                                                                                                                       
15 Aamer Madhani, Chicago police and ACLU agree to stop-and-frisk safeguards, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/31277041/. 
16 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (appointing a monitor and ordering broad 
systemic equitable relief). 
17 Investigatory Stop and Protective Pat Down Settlement Agreement, Aug, 5, 2015, http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme.pdf 
[hereinafter “Chicago settlement”]. 
18 Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree at 4-5, Bailey v. Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952 
(E.D. Pa. 2010), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198/ [hereinafter “Philadelphia Settlement”] 
19 In re Cincinnati Policing, No.-C-1-99-317 (April 11, 2002) (on file with author); see also In re Cincinnati 
Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 400 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (affirming settlement). 
20 United States v. City of New Orleans, Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, 2-12-cv-
01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012) [hereinafter “New Orleans Decree”] (on file with author); United States v. 
City of New Orleans, 947 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming consent 
decree). 
21 United States v. City of Seattle, Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, No. 12-
CV-1282 (W.D. Wa July 27, 2012) [hereinafter “Seattle settlement”] (on file with author); see also Mahoney v. 
Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (describing settlement process). 
22 Agreement in Principle Between The United States and the City of Baltimore Regarding the Baltimore City Police 
Department, Aug. 10, 2-16, https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883376/download [hereinafter “Baltimore 
Agreement”]. 
23 Josh Saul, America has a Stop and Frisk Problem: Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 2016, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html 
24 Id.  
25 Strategies for Change: Research Initiatives and Recommendations To Improve Police-Community Relations in 
Oakland, Calif., (Jennifer L. Eberhardt, ed. June 20, 2016), https://sparq.stanford.edu/opd-reports [hereinafter 
“Oakland report”]; “Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study 
Results,” Oct 8, 2014, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-
interrogation-and-observation-fio-study-results (reporting some racial disparities in both stops and frisks). 
26 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 
(1968). Separately, the Fourth Amendment requires that an officer “reasonably suspect that the person stopped is 
armed and dangerous” before conducting a protective pat-down, or frisk. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).  
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adopted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” certain 
racial groups.27  
 
Other consent decrees and settlements are also crafted in the shadow of Terry and 
Feeney. The Seattle settlement is typical in commanding that the police department adopt a 
street-stop policy that “explicitly conform[s] to constitutional requirements, that officers be 
annually trained on “Fourth Amendment and related law,” and that patrolling police act “free of 
unlawful bias.”28 Similarly, the Philadelphia settlement condemns “stops, frisks, or searches … 
made without the requisite reasonable suspicion” and envisages “policies and practices to ensure 
that stops and frisks are not conducted on the basis of the race or ethnic origin of the suspect, 
except where the law permits race or ethnic origin to be considered.”29 This individualist black-
letter doctrine means that even absent litigation to a final judgment, courts and legal reform 
efforts have a narrow focus on discrete, interpersonal transactions. Similarly, the dominant 
economic model of racial bias in policing focuses on the identification of taste-based 
discrimination over and above statistical discrimination. 30 
This Article argues that SQF presents a normative challenge that is not well captured by 
the individualistic lens of Terry or Feeney, or the economic literature’s focus on taste-based 
discrimination. The distinctive moral harm of SQF does not turn on racial animus per Feeney, or 
weak evidentiary predicates per Terry (although both might exist on the ground). It does not arise 
within the narrow, individualist “transactional frame” that currently dominates both law and 
economics.31  
SQF today is defined by its large scale and “group-based” application.32 Its distinctive 
moral wrong is inextricably related to this programmatic quality, not the happenstance of 
individual officers’ motives.33 The core of this wrong is structural. Accordingly, the welfarist 
analysis I propose in Part I is focused on the large-scale, programmatic use of SQF as obserbed 
in New York Chicago, and Philadelphia; I have no cavil with the retail use of Terry stops as an 
element of nonprogrammatic street policing. When operationalized at a large scale, however. 
SQF is a key link in the reproduction of social and racial stratification, typically with large 
regressive distributional effects and surprisingly little value-added as a crime control measure. 
                                                
27 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
28 Seattle settlement, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 140, 142 & 145. 
29 Philadelphia settlement, supra note 18, at 1 & 5.  
30 John Knowles, Nicola Persico, & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 
J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001).  
31 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (2002) 
(“Constitutional cases, like common-law ones, are typically conceptualized as discrete transactions in which 
government inflicts harm on some individual by making her worse off relative to some baseline position or, under 
equality rules, relative to some reference individual or group.”). 
32 Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821 
(2011) (offering this description of New York City’s policy). The dominant “individualism” of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence has long been subject to decisive and devastating critique. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107, 127 (1976).  
33 I use the term “moral wrong” to signal that my argument is not centrally normative, and not legal in nature. My 
analysis, presented in Part II, is consequentialist in nature. It is my view that the range of relevant consequences for 
an evaluation of public policy is capacious, and not limited to narrowly drawn monetizable harms. Recognizing the 
normative nature of any effort to identify salient costs and benefits, I flag in my analysis those costs or benefits that 
rest on a potentially contestable moral judgment.     
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More specifically, SQF should be understood as a historically situated innovation that responds 
to late twentieth-century urban pathologies in a way that perpetuates those pathologies. The call 
for SQF arose in important measure because local and state governments had helped foster 
minority neighborhoods entrenched in concentrated poverty and suffering from high violent-
crime rates. Rather than addressing those underlying conditions, local and state policy-makers 
elected to respond with a policy that has limited crime-control benefits but large negative 
spillovers on disadvantaged neighborhoods. Viewed in a dynamic perspective, SQF catalyzes an 
entangled set of individual and neighborhood-level harms. Through mutually reinforcing 
interactions, these various harms reinforce the social and racial stratification that initially set the 
stage for massive street policing expenditures. Without a clear grasp of this ecological and 
dynamic context, current remedial interventions are likely go astray. 
 
If in response to such ecological and dynamic dimensions, constitutional law is disarmed. 
Some other tool is needed. Consistent with a growing body of scholarship that resists the narrow 
transactional frame of current constitutional doctrine34 and the dominant doctrinal focus on 
individual officials’ fault,35 I argue that our current doctrinal models for capturing the harms of 
aggressive policing are woefully inadequate. Instead, we need a more structural and capacious 
legal framework to encapsulate the core moral objections to SQF.  
An alternative, more promising legal framework is a version of the disparate impact 
standard familiar from the employment discrimination36 and fair housing contexts.37 A disparate-
impact framework is better able to account for the evidentiary problems involved in accounting 
for the diverse forms of discrimination manifested in a complex system characterized by a high 
decree of diffused discretion.38 It is by no means perfect. It does not provide a proxy for the 
thorough evaluation of both costs and benefits presented in this Article. Rather, disparate impact 
isolates a subset of problematic cases in which SQF’s heavy burden is asymmetrically positioned 
on minority communities, and demands a robust justification from the state for that potentially 
regressive, subordinating, and demoralizing situation. In this regard, it is better placed than either 
Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection doctrine to resist the exacerbation of racial hierarchies.39 
No theory of liability, however, will be a comprehensive panacea to a complex and entrenched 
phenomenon like concentrated, racialized poverty. Disparate impact liability for SQF captures 
                                                
S See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2049, 2051, 2057 (2016) (criticizing “criminal courts’ transactional myopia” and their lack of “a holistic 
picture of how the criminal justice system operates”). 
35 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies. 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2015) 
(arguing that “the Court has developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies”); 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
670, 706 (2011) (same). 
36 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (“[A] complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing disparate 
impact under the 1964 version of Title VII). A disparate-impact theory of liability is also available under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005.  
37 Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) 
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & 3605(a) to permit disparate impact liability). 
38 Cf. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 520-23 
(2003) (discussing the evidentiary use of disparate impact liability). 
39 Id. at 523-24. 
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the instances in which the moral wrong of SQF is at its acme, and helps ensures that policing 
responses make matters no worse. 
Disparate impact liability is overlooked because it has not been part of Equal Protection 
doctrine since the early 1970s.40 Because of the Constitution-centered focus of much scholarship, 
it is easy to forget it is available. But a disparate-impact standard is available under both federal 
statutes that regulate local police departments41 and also (in California42 and Illinois43) state law. 
The Chicago settlement and the New Orleans settlement invoke some of these disparate-impact 
rules as guiding authorizations. 44  Nevertheless, neither elaborates upon their bare-bone 
references. As a result, the analytic and practical advantages of a disparate-impact lens for police 
remain underappreciated. The theoretical questions raised by its translation to the policing 
context also remain poorly understood.  
My final aim, therefore, is to show how disparate impact can serve as a lens for analyzing 
street policing in practice. To that end, I consider how disparate racial impacts might be sifted 
from the granular policing data increasing being collected by large police departments as a result 
of settlements and consent decrees.45 Specifically I sketch three tractable empirical strategies for 
identifying disparate impact in street stop-related policies. First, deployment-related disparities 
between beats or districts within a jurisdiction can be measured to ascertain whether a 
muncipality’s overall distribution of policing resources can be justified on race-neutral 
grounds.46 Second, within a given beat or district, disparities in how stops are allocated among 
different ethnic and racial groups can be evaluated.47 Finally, at the level of given officers, 
                                                
40 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or 
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional Solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). Prior to Davis, disparate impact was an important element of the 
constitutional doctrine in this domain. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-16 
(2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided”] (collecting cases).  
41 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations apply to police departments that receive 
federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §2000d “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); see also 28 C.F.R. §41.101 et seq. (implementing 
regulations). The Safe Streets Act also prohibits local police action with a racially disparate impact. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
3789d (“No person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in 
connection with any programs or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.”); 
see also 28 C.F.R. §42.203 (implementing regulations). 
42 West’s Ann. Cal. Gov. Code §11135; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, §§ 98101(c) & (i). 
43 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 23/5 (a)(1). 
44 Chicago Settlement, supra note 17, at 6; New Orleans settlement, supra note 19, at 2.  
45 David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 853, 863 (2013). 
46 On the role of larger policy in shaping street-level outcomes, Shannon Portillo & Danielle S. Rudes, Construction 
of Justice at the Street Level, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 321, 331 (2014) (“When police routinize stop and frisk 
policies, and … ration services, attempt to control uncertainty, husband worker resources, and manage consequences 
of routines, they do so within the confines of existing policy.”). 
47 Precinct or beat-level effects can be captured through multilevel modeling techniques in which data on stops is 
structured so that individual racial groups are nested within precincts. For examples of this approach, see Expert 
Report of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan at 40, Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf [hereinafter “Fagan Report”]; 
Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's “Stop and 
Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 813, 817-18 (2007).  
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disparities in the quantum of suspicion deployed for whites and nonwhites can be assessed by a 
range of tools.48 By aggregating and contrasting disparities at different levels, the empirical 
toolkit I sketch enables a better understanding of the causes and extent of SQF’s disparate 
impact. That understanding in turn can serve as a foundation for more targeted, less disruptive, 
and more effective equitable remedial interventions.  
These empirical approaches, moreover, enable disparate impact’s translation to the 
policing context while avoiding the constitutional and practical problems encountered in the 
employment discrimination context. For each empirical approach posited, I therefore consider 
the range of exculpatory justifications that might be offered to diffuse a prima facie finding of 
racial disparity.49 I further respond to weaknesses apparent from disparate impact’s application to 
other contexts. In the employment discrimination context, for example, there has been 
disagreement about how to identify business justifications that can justify racial disparities,50 and 
the magnitude of ultimate disparities required for liability.51 The use of disparate impact in the 
employment context has also generated worries about the doctrine’s constitutionality52 and its 
efficacy in promoting structural policy change.53 In translating disparate impact to the policing 
context, I consider and reject each of these reasons as a reason for abandoning the translation. 
The possibility of disparate impact as a template for rethinking urban policing has yet to 
be explored in any detail, although an earlier article by David Sklansky and colleagues touches 
on the question.54 But my analysis aligns with penetrating work by Tracey Meares, Jeffrey 
Fagan, and Amanda Geller, all of whom emphasize that SQF is a distinctive mode of urban 
policing that cannot be analyzed in terms of discrete interactions, because “programmatic stops 
are imposed from the top down” at a massive scale.55 Furthermore I echo Richard Bank’s worry 
                                                
48 Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding racial Disparities in New York 
City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 100 Ann. App. Stat. 365); see also Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police 
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, -- NEW CRIM L. REV. --, at 5 (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://5harad.com/papers/policing-the-police.pdf.  
49 See Abrams, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing potential justifications).  
50 The availability of employer justifications has been the subject of dispute both on the Supreme Court and in 
Congress. Compare Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (describing a relatively lenient 
standard for business justifications, with id. at 671-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a more demanding 
standard); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that an employer “demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”); Michael 
Selmi, The Supreme Court's Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 281, 287-89 (2011) (describing disagreements legislators and President George H.W. Bush on this topic).  
51 On disputes over the threshold disparity for liability, see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact 
Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 573 (1991) (noting that “four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for 
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence,” but also 
collecting dissenting views). 
52 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate impact and 
equal protection will be waged sooner or later [so] … “it behooves us now to begin thinking about how--and on 
what terms--to make peace between them.”). 
53 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 706 (2006) (noting that 
“disparate impact theory has produced less change than typically assumed”); accord George Rutherglen, Abolition 
in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1992). 
54 Sharad Goel et al. Combatting Police Discrimination in an Age of Big Data, -- NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. – (forthcoming 2016). 
55 Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk As A Program, 
Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162-63 (2015) [hereinafter “Meares, Programming Errors”]; Fagan & 
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about the “potential inadequacy as a policy framework” of much constitutional doctrine,” 
although my diagnosis and response differ from his.56 By contrast, my analysis diverges sharply 
from the large literature on “racial profiling,”57 which more narrowly focuses on intentional 
animus or the purposive use of race as a criterion in enforcement decisions.58 My approach does 
not focus on individual fault or bad intent. Instead, my concern is with the interaction between a 
specific kind of common policing strategy and larger social dynamics of racial segmentation and 
stratification.59  
The argument proceeds in three steps. In Part I, I provide a thick, empirically robust 
account of SQF as a distinctive modality of urban policing highlighting the dynamic negative 
effects of SQF upon minority communities in concentrated urban poverty. Part II turns to the 
constitutional doctrine developed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause to regulate such policing. Using Terry and Feeney as focal points, I demonstrate that 
constitutional doctrine systematically fails to account for the harms that flow from SQF. The gap 
reveals inconsistencies and internal contradictions within the doctrine. Having rejected the 
default framework for legal analysis of SQF, I sketch in Part III an alternative lens of disparate 
impact. Concluding, I illustrate three empirical strategies that might be used to determine 
whether remedial intervention is warranted. In so doing, I hope to show that disparate impact is a 
practicable and plausible approach for courts and other supervisory bodies.  
I. The Costs and Benefits of Stop-and-Frisk Policing  
To evaluate stop-and-frisk as a way of eliciting public order requires an understanding of 
its costs and benefits in historical and social context. This Part therefore first offers a definition 
of SQF as a historically situated strategy employed by urban police forces, and then develops a 
careful tally of its pros and cons. Some courts have analyzed SQF in terms of costs while 
                                                                                                                                                       
Geller, supra note 10, at 61 (“Stop-and-frisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was largely a set of distinct “retail” 
transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia, and specificity. But the current 
“wholesale” practice is quite different from the vision of the Terry Court.”). 
56 R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574 (2003). 
57 Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical 
Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 n.2 (2015) (collecting the large legal 
scholarly literature on racial profiling). 
58 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the 
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 664-65 (2002) (“As we use the term, “racial profiling” occurs when a law 
enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer 
believes that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit 
the sort of crime the officer is investigating.”; Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) (using the term “racial profiling” to mean police action taken “because the 
officer believes that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to 
commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating”); R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and 
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2001) (focusing on the use of 
“[s]uspect description reliance, like racial profiling, [as] both useful and racially discriminatory.”). Outside the legal 
academy, racial profiling is also defined in criminological, economic, and normative terms. Robin S. Engel, A 
Critique of the ‘Outcome Test’ in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1, 6 (2008) (summarizing different 
approaches). My analysis of SQF overlaps with Engel’s “economic” and “normative models. Id.  
59 The “disparate impact” analysis defines its central analytic focus in terms of “purposeful” discrimination, rather 
than differential effects. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton Mosher & Travis Pratt, Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, 
and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL'Y 1.5 (2009). This is not how the term is used in 
the legal scholarship, and I do not follow that definition. 
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bracketing benefits.60 I disagree with this approach. Appreciation of the distinctive wrong of 
SQF demands a comprehensive understanding of justifications, criticisms, but also benefits, all 
nested in a ecological and dynamic context.  
A. Defining Stop and Frisk (“SQF”)  
 Stop, question, and frisk, or SQF, is an urban policing measure that involves the large-
scale deployment of officers in public spaces (e.g., sidewalks, alleys, the communal outdoor 
spaces of public housing) tasked with conducting frequent investigative stops. Under a line of 
cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio,61 an officer is entitled to make a “brief” nonconsensual 
“investigatory stop” if she has “reasonable articulable suspicion” that a crime either has occurred 
or is about to occur.62 Separately, if the officer has a further reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the person stopped is “armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,’ she may 
conducted a “limited protective search” for weapons.63 Reasonable articulable suspicion is a less 
demanding standard than probable cause, but still requires “a minimal level of objective 
justification”64 In addition to a stop and a frisk, officers may take further actions ranging from a 
verbal caution or a citation, or an arrest. Arrests vary widely in character. They might be 
discretionary or mandatory.65 They may be based on conduct or evidence discovered by the 
officer during the stop, or they might be predicated on an outstanding warrant revealed when a 
person’s name is cross-referenced with state, local, or federal databases.  
The jurisprudence of Terry stops and frisks relentlessly focuses on discrete transactions 
between specific officers and specific defendants. But this is misleading.66 SQF is a policy that 
operates at scale. Not tens or hundreds of individuals but tens or hundreds of thousands are 
arrested over the course of months. In New York, for example, there were 313,047 documented 
stops in 2004 and 576,394 stops in 2009.67 In Philadelphia, a city with one-fifth New York’s 
population, there were more than 200,000 stops each of the last three years, despite the existence 
                                                
60 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) “(This Court's mandate is solely to 
judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool....”). 
61 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court did not provide the canonical formulation of the Fourth Amendment standard, 
but instead more ambiguously asked whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?’” Id. at 21-22. 
62 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The earliest use of the phrase “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is 
twelve years after Terry in Brown v. Texas, and in that context is an (unattributed) quotation from the state’s brief. 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The phrase is used as law of the case first in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) 
63 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 
64 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
65 The standard view in criminology is that arrests are a highly discretionary decision because they are dispersed, 
somewhat aleatory in timing, and hence hard to supervise. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408 (2005); accord Eisha Jain, Arrests 
As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 817 (2015). Even where law imposes a duty on officers to make an arrest 
(e.g., in domestic violence cases), officers as a practical matter maintain a measure of discretion as to what to do.  
66 Meares, Programming Errors, supra note 55, at 175. 
67 Fagan Expert Report, supra note 47, at 18-19; see also supra text accompanying notes 6 to 10 (citing stop rates in 
New York and Chicago). 
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of a court-supervised consent decree.68 The analysis in this section is focused on SQF as 
deployed en masse.  
SQF has similarities to, and can overlap somewhat with, the strategy of “broken 
windows” or “quality of life” policing.69 But the tactics are distinct. Whereas broken windows 
policing relies on arrests “to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood,”70 SQF tends to 
involve a relatively low rate of arrests.71 SQF tends to be a direct response to violent crime, and 
not a prophylactic response to the possibility that the sight of “broken windows” will induce 
escalating forms of disorder.72  
 One more detail is essential to my functional definition of SQF: Within a city, SQF is 
typically employed with greatest intensity on a small subset of neighborhoods.73 Typically, its 
deployment is highest in neighborhoods characterized by “concentrated poverty” where crime 
rates tend to be higher than in other parts of the city.74 In Chicago, for example, one study of 
stops in 2014 found 266 people per 1,000 in the African-American neighborhood of Englewood 
and 43 per 1,000 in the white neighborhood of Lincoln/Foster. 75  SQF also tends to be 
concentrated upon minority—i.e., African-American and Hispanic--neighborhoods. Hence, the 
district court in Floyd found that the racial composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor 
of the density of stops than its lagged crime rate.76 And at the height of New York’s SQF, an 
African-American resident of New York City had a 92 percent chance of being stopped in a 
single year period.77 SQF, in short, is not just a high-frequency policing strategy, it is also a 
highly geographically concentrated one in minority (African-American and Hispanic) 
                                                
68 Plaintiffs’ fifth report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, in United States v. Bailey, No. 10-5952, 
at 20 (2015), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/2230/198/.  
69 Amanda Geller, The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Arrests in the Broken Windows Era, 37 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1025, 1029 (2016) (distinguishing the two approaches); accord Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship 
Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504 
(2014).  
70 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic (Mar. 
1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465. 
71 Geller, supra note 69, at 1032 (noting, based on New York data, that “relatively few street stops lead to arrest”). 
That said, “broken windows” policing, and a concomitant rise in the rate of arrests tends to be geographically 
collocated with SQF.  
72 See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 70. A decisive critique is offered in BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF 
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 166-80 (2001). 
73 David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New 
York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a 
Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129 (2014) (finding that a majority of stops in New York occurred at just 5 
percent of intersections).  
74 For empirical evidence, see Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, 
and Violent Crime: Recent Lessons and New Directions for Research, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 347-52 (2005); 
Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 124-25 
(2000). 
75 Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 9. 
76 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Fagan Expert Report, supra note 47, at 3-
4 (explaining neighborhood differences).  
77 AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41 (2014). 
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neighborhoods. So even if it entails a low rate of arrest, it is likely that SQF at least contributes 
to the exceeding high rates of minority arrest in the United States.78 
In sum, SQF is best understood as the large-scale use of Terry stops in predominantly 
black and Hispanic urban neighborhoods in response to violent crime. Its architects are 
cognizant, and embrace, this racial symmetry.79 But rather than dwelling on whether their views 
should be ranked as invidious discrimination, I engage in a more consequentialist inquiry: I 
consider the gains and the harms from SQF. These, I contend, must be understood in light of 
geographic and historical context to be appreciated properly. It is the benefits of SQF that I focus 
upon first, before considering costs. 
B. The Crime-Control Benefits of SQF in Context  
1. The Case for SQF  
 
 Aggressive use of street stops at a high volume has a long historical pedigree.80 By 1969, 
they had become so endemic that the Kerner Commission, established by President Johnson to 
investigate the 1967 urban riots, singled out excessive investigate stop, and the “wholesale 
harassment by certain elements of the police community of which minority groups, particularly 
Negros, frequently complain.”81 Today’s fires are echoes of yesterday’s conflagrations.  
 
SQF in its modern form is a direct response to an uptick of violent crime in the 1980s 
collocated with what William Julius Wilson called the persistence of “ghetto poverty.”82 The 
                                                
78 In expectation, about forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino men will be arrested by age 
twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 
CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014). 
79 See, e.g., Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Commissioner Kelly Says Almost 75% of Violent Crime Committed by 
African-Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 2, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/commissioner-kelly-
defends-stop-and-frisk-targeting-african-americans-article-1.1332840#ixzz2UiHaXcKt; Azi Paybarah, Ray Kelly: 
By the Department’s Count African-Americans are Being Understopped, POLITICO, May 2, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2013/05/ray-kelly-by-the-departments-count-african-
americans-are-being-understopped-000000; Ray Kelly, The NYPD: Guilty of Saving 7,383 Lives, WALL ST. J., July 
22, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324448104578616333588719320; see also Heather 
McDonald, How to Increase the Crime Rate Nationwide, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324063304578525850909628878 (defending racially disparate 
street policing on the ground that “the preponderance of crime perpetrators, and victims, in New York are also 
minorities”).  
80 The earliest programmatic use of SQF I have been able to identify occurred in Cincinnati’s Avondale 
neighborhood in 1958. Alex Elkins, The Origins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN, May 2015. It was subsequently used in 
cities such as San Francisco in the 1960s. CHRISTOPHER LOWEN AGEE, THE STREETS OF SAN FRANCISCO: POLICING 
AND THE CREATION OF A COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL POLITICS, 1950-1972, at 35-39 (2014). During most of the 
twentieth century, however the use of street patrols was in the decline. Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban 
Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992). Up to the 1960s, policing as “primarily reactive,” an orientation 
modified by the rise of community policing. James J, Willis, A Recent History of Police, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane, eds. 2014). A 1966 study of Chicago 
police, for example, found they spent one percent of their time actively stopping point, 14 percent reacting to the 
public’s calls, and 85 percent on unstructured random patrols. Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based 
Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIM & JUST. 377, 378 (2013). 
81 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 143-44, 302-03 (1968).  
82 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 12 (1996). 
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political sponsors of the policy consistently identified violent crime control as its core aim.83 
Because violent crime is disproportionately committed by African-Americans, and concentrated 
in black neighborhood, they argued, it is no surprise that SQF focuses on those predominantly 
minority neighborhoods. Rather than proof of anti-minority animus, the use of SQF is on this 
view evidence that police are exerting special efforts to protect minorities from crime. The 
persuasive force of this argument from crime-control is the subject of this section, while the tally 
of SQF’s costs is addressed in the following section.  
 
The genesis of this argument for SQF’s benefits traced back to the early 1990s. In 1994, 
the sociologist James Q. Wilson published an influential opinion piece in the New York Times 
entitled “Just Take Away their Guns,” which captured the distinctive appeal of SQF.84 Wilson 
argued for the aggressive use of Terry stops as a means to “reduce the number of people who 
carry guns unlawfully, especially in places -- on streets, in taverns -- where the mere presence of 
a gun can increase the hazards we all face.”85 His call responded directly to a very real crisis of 
law and order. At the time, New York City was suffering from a high homicide rate.86 Of the 
1951 murders that occurred in New York in 1993, the year ending as Wilson wrote, more than 
1,500 were committed by firearm.87  
 
Wilson’s call for aggressive street policing as a prophylaxis for gun voice found a 
measure of empirical support the following year. In 1995, the criminologist Lawrence Sherman 
and colleagues published the results of a quasi-experiment conducted for 29 weeks in Kansas 
City of gun-based, intensive street-policing, and found an astonishing 49 percent decline in gun 
crimes without any spillover to neighboring areas.88  
 
Results of this kind prompted “[s]everal cities to “rush[] to follow the Kansas City model 
…”89 by seizing upon SQF as a tool for lowering violent crime rates. The earliest adopter of 
SQF, New York City, seems to have begun aggressive use of Terry stops (as distinct from 
‘broken windows’ policing) around 1994. A parallel aggressive use of stops in Philadelphia came 
to public attention in 2000, after a scandal involving hundreds of unlawful arrests, searches, and 
prosecutions in the 39th Police District led to the disclosure of incident reports showing a high 
rate of illegal stops.90 In the early 1990s, constitutional litigation over Chicago’s ‘gang loitering’ 
ordinance in part hinged on the 42,000 stops executed under that measure over three years.91 The 
                                                
83 Leo Eisenstein & Laura Gottesdiener, Why Michael Bloomberg is Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk, ROLLING STONE, 
May 22, 2013, http:// www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-michael-bloomberg-is-wrong-about-stop-and-frisk-
20130522 (“Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly have dismissed these concerns, 
claiming that stop-and-frisk has dramatically reduced the city's murder rate.”). 
84 James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1994. 
85 Id. 
86 Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534 (1999). 
87 Id. at 534-35. 
88 Lawrence W. Sherman & D.P. Rogan, Effects of gun seizures on gun violence: “Hot spots” patrols in Kansas 
City, 12 JUST. Q. 445, 445-73 (1995). 
89 Meares, Law and Social Science, supra note 1, at 340; Bellin, supra note 69, at 1505 (“[T]he NYPD uses stop and 
frisk to find guns and deter gun-carrying ….”). 
90 Complaint in Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952, at ¶¶ 83-84 (E.D. Pa. 2010), 
https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198/. 
91 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49 (1999). Ten years earlier, another class action alleged that Chicago 
police would improperly “arrest, … charge and … detain … persons for disorderly conduct … with no intent to 
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Chicago Police Department’s limited collection of information about its stops and frisks meant 
that it was not until 2015 that data emerged showing that the city’s SQF intensity had exceeded 
its usage patterns of the 1990s (and, incidentally, also overshot New York City’s stop rates).92 
 
Crucially, the policing strategy endorsed by Wilson, and implicitly supported by the 
Kansas City evidence, does not lend itself to uniform application across entire cities. Violent 
crime in urban contexts has long been closely correlated with a subset of geographic areas 
typically characterized by concentrated poverty.93 In turn, concentrated urban poverty, both in 
the 1990s and today, is not evenly spread across racial ethnic groups. Rather, it is a 
disproportionately minority phenomenon.94 Not only impoverished African-Americans, but also 
black middle-class cohorts are disproportionately represented in extremely poor urban 
neighborhoods.95 One side effect of this is that urban violent crime impacts minority groups 
more grievously than non-minority groups.96 In 1993, the year before Wilson wrote, the African-
American homicide victimization rate per 100,000 population was 47.0, while the white rate was 
6.4.97 From the perspective of its political sponsors, SQF has to train upon African-American and 
Hispanic neighborhoods not because of some theory of race and crime, but because that is where 
the murders—the murders of minority citizens—are happening.98  
 
If American cities were in progress toward meaningful racial integration, this nexus 
between policing and race might be expected to have waned by today. But despite increasing 
                                                                                                                                                       
prosecute such charges in court.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 104 F.R.D. 404, 404 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 1000,000 
people were arrested in these operations. Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 5. 
92 Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 6, 10. 
93 There is an enormous empirical literature to this effect. A useful summary is Janet J. Lauritzen & Robert J. 
Sampson, Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58, 65-70 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Peterson & Krivo, supra note 78, at 347-52; Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. 
Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 
918, 923-24 (1997). 
94 See Glenn Firebaugh and Chad R. Farrell, Still Large, but Narrowing: The Sizable Decline in Racial 
Neighborhood Inequality in Metropolitan America, 1980–2010, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 139 (2016) (analyzing data from 
1980 to 2010, and finding that “greater concentration of blacks and Hispanics in poorer-than-average 
neighborhoods” in urban contexts); see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE 
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (describing racial character of concentrated poverty in Chicago). For the 
correlations between poverty, crime, and racial segregation, see Edward S. Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation 
and Crime: The Effect of Black Social Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 Soc. Forces 1325, 1345 
(1996) (finding that “segregation is a major predictor of the rates of homicide and robbery among blacks”). 
95 Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of Three Segregations, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 
354, 354-55 (2012) (finding that black poverty concentration stems from the complex interaction of racial 
segregation, poverty-status segregation within race, and segregation of blacks from high- and middle-income 
members of other racial groups). 
96 Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474 (2000) (“In urban areas, many poor people of color live in conditions of residential 
segregation, concentrated poverty, and unemployment that predict the breakdown of community social processes, 
which in turn predict elevated crime rates.” (footnote omitted)). 
97 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 10 fig.1.5 (2007). 
98 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing defendant’s argument 
that “the apparently disproportionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics can be explained on race-neutral grounds by 
police deployment to high crime areas, and by racial differences in crime rates”).  
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ethnic and racial diversity within cities, urban racial segregation endures.99 As many American 
cities today are as “hypersegregated” today as were in 1970.100 The experience of residential 
segregation moreover, has remained especially stable for African-Americans regardless of 
class. The proportion of African-American areas lacking racial diversity “remained stubbornly 
set at around 8.6 percent” throughout the 1990s. 101 Even “relatively advantaged” black 
neighborhoods “continue to be unique in the degree to which they are spatially linked with 
communities of severe concentrated disadvantage.”102  
 
The argument in favor of SQF, in short, rests on its ability to mitigate the costs of violent 
crime particularly associated with urban minority-dominated neighborhoods. To the extent that 
areas of concentrated poverty persist in cities, and to the extent they are predominantly black or 
Hispanic, SQF might even be viewed as a form of affirmative action. It is a positive subsidy to 
impoverished minority communities, a surplus provision of the public good of policing. In 
former New York police commissioner Ray Kelly’s words, the real problem with urban policing 
is then that “African-Americans are being understopped” in light of the violent crime 
experienced by black communities.103  
 
2. The Difficulties of SQF as Violent Crime Control  
 
 The benefits of SQF, however, are more qualified than its advocates suggest. I focus here 
on how those benefits are properly characterized before turning to the policy’s costs. Focusing 
solely upon SQF’s suppression of violent crime, there are both reasons for skepticism of the 
magnitude of the ensuing benefit, and grounds for treating the benefits as morally problematic. 
These concerns, I stress, bear on SQF’s efficacy, not the moral urgency of addressing the 
hecatomb of contemporary urban homicide.  
 
I highlight four grounds for concern. First, the evidence for an absolute crime-control 
effect from SQF is surprisingly fragile. Second, the evidence of a marginal effect from SQF in 
comparison to other methods is nonexistent. What evidence exists suggests many of the crime-
control benefits of SQF might be obtained without its aggregate, racially disparate aspect. Third, 
and relatedly, the claim that SQF disproportionately benefits African-Americans rests on 
complex and controversial assumptions. Finally, even assuming firm evidence of large crime-
control gains from SQF, there is a normative objection to the state taking credit for those benefits 
                                                
99 See John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, & Reynolds Farley, Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades 
of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY, 1, 7 (2004) (finding that despite modest declines in racial segregation, blacks remain 
“substantially more” segregated from whites than Hispanics or Asians).  
100 Douglas S. Massey and Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation, 23 
DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1027 (2015). 
101 Steven R. Holloway, Richard Wright & Mark Ellis, The Racially Fragmented City? Neighborhood Racial 
Segregation and Diversity Jointly Considered, 64 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 63, 69-70 (2012). 
102 Patrick Sharkey, Spatial segmentation and the black middle class, 119 AM. J. SOC. 903, 905-06 (2014). 
103 See sources cited in supra note 79. For scholarly defenses of SQF and its effect on violent crime, see, e.g., David 
Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 117, 141 (2013) (describing Rosenthal’s endorsement of SQF on public safety grounds); Bellin, supra note 
69, at 1538 (“[A] high volume of arbitrary frisks is essential to effectively deterring gun possession”). Bellin’s 
position, however, is more nuanced and careful than Rosenthal’s concludes that SQF is not narrowly tailored as 
required by the application of strict scrutiny under Equal Protection doctrine. Bellin, supra note 69, at 1546.  
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when the governmental entities responsible for SQF also contributed to minority segregation into 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.  
 
First, notwithstanding Sherman’s Kansas City study, “it is very difficult to connect [SQF] 
to any crime reduction.” 104  Two subsequent efforts at replicating the former study, in 
Indianapolis and Pittsburgh, have produced ambivalent results.105 The Indianapolis study, for 
example, found that homicide rates decreased in one of two treatment areas, but remained 
unchanged in the other.106 Its authors concluded that the “present state of knowledge does not 
allow us to answer the theoretical questions of what produced the effects in Kansas City.”107 A 
meta-analysis of six policing experiments involving increased police patrols in North and South 
America reexamined the Pittsburgh data, and suggested that while the study had found a 
statistically significant reduction in gun violence, alternative specifications “strongly sugges[t] 
the estimated drop in shots-fired incidents was due at least in part to a preintervention trend, a 
seasonal pattern, or chance.”108 Nevertheless, the authors of the meta-study found themselves 
ultimately “generally favorable” to the method pioneered in Kansas City, but raised concerns 
about whether the results of Sherman’s experiment could be scaled up beyond the level of 
smaller neighborhoods.109  
 
In an operational context, SQF fares less well. Rigorous empirical studies of SQF’s post-
1994 deployment are rare. Existing results, though, provide sparse support for its crime-control 
effects. For example, a study of the effects of SQF on burglary and robbery rates in New York 
between 2003 and 2010 found “few significant effects.”110 Another quantitative study of New 
York found that “the number of shooting incidents was virtually unchanged during the years in 
which stops and frisks grew at an extraordinary rate,” suggesting that it was “extremely unlikely 
that these stops could have reduced the homicide rate by reducing gun ownership or carrying.”111 
The most detailed and comprehensive study of overall trends in recent crime rates in New York, 
by Franklin Zimring, also concluded that in the New York City context, “there is no way to 
separately measure the value added by aggressive intervention in New York City.”112 Zimring 
himself seems of two minds about SQF. On the one hand, he identifies “aggressive[e]” measures 
such as hot-spot policing, the elimination of open-air drug markets, and firearm reduction as 
                                                
104 Meares, Law and Social Science, supra note 1, at 345. 
105 CHARLES EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS 
DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32-33 (2014) (describing and discussing both studies). 
106 Edmund F. McGarrell, Steven Chermal, & Alexander Weiss, Reducing Firearms Violence through Directed 
Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 119, 143-44 (2001). 
107 Id. at 145. 
108 Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police crackdowns on illegal gun carrying: A systemic review of 
their impact on gun crime, 2 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 227, 245-46 (2006). 
109 Id. at 248-49. 
110 Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in 
New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 1. 1-2 (2012). Rosenberg and Robert Fornango persuasively argue that that a 
2008 study that did find a negative relation between SQF and crime was methodologically flawed because it failed 
to include precinct-level socioeconomic effects or year fixed effects. Id. at 103.  
111 David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City's Crime Decline: Methodological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 181-82 
(2012); accord Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of 
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL 
READINGS 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) .  
112 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS 
CONTROL 148-49 (2012) [hereinafter “ZIMRING, CITY THAT BECAME SAFE”].  
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“probably” successful.113 On the other hand, he is more confident that “data driven crime 
mapping and patrol strategy management” and the hiring of police officers did likely have large 
and negative effects on crime rates.114 At the very best, Zimring’s evidence leaves open the 
possibility that SQF had some role to play in crime reduction. It casts no light on the magnitude 
of that role, or whether the same gains in public order might have been achieved through 
alternate means.    
 
Another potential means of examining SQF’s impact is to examine the aftermath of the 
policy’s unexpected discontinuance. But there has also been no detailed study of what happened 
after the New York City Police Department reduced the number of stops dramatically in 2013. In 
the three years after that decline began, however, murder rates have remained “essentially 
flat.”115 In Chicago, a more complicated story obtains. A sharp rise in murder and decline in 
arrests followed the December 2015 release of long-suppressed video footage of a fatal police 
shooting provoked sharp public outcry against Chicago Police Department116 Immediately 
thereafter, in January 2016, changes to how stops and frisks are recorded—but no change to 
operational policy—went into effect. Given that the highly critical public reaction to the video 
likely had a significant effect on multiple aspects of police behavior, it is hard to disentangle any 
discrete effect from changes in SQF policy.   
 
The empirical case for a crime-control benefit from SQF, in short, does not stand on 
strong foundations.117 The weakness of its evidentiary predicate contrasts with strong evidence 
for other kinds of reform, including the deployment of more officers and the use of more data-
driven approaches. While there is some empirical support for an effect in small-scale 
experiments (although the degree of such support has been challenged118), there is no existing 
evidence that this effect can be replicated at a citywide level. More than forty years after 
Wilson’s initial intervention, therefore, SQF remains largely predicated on a well-intentioned 
guess about the effect of intensive street stops on violent crime levels.  
 
                                                
113 Id. at 145. 
114 Id. at 147-48. I am grateful to John Rappaport for discussion on this point.   
115 Toni Monkovic, Ted Cruz Was Wrong on Murders in New York, but Perception Is Hard to Shake, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/upshot/ted-cruz-was-wrong-on-murders-in-new-york-but-
perception-is-hard-to-shake.html. 
116 Rob Arthur & Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked — And Arrests Declined — In Chicago Right After The Laquan 
McDonald Video Release, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, April 11, 2016, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun-violence-
spiked-and-arrests-declined-in-chicago-right-after-the-laquan-mcdonald-video-release/. 
117 At least one commentator cites a 2006 study of a multi-pronged anti-narcotics strategy in New York City public 
housing as evidence of the efficacy of SQF. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and 
the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1251, n.295 (2015). But the study in question 
involved a program that “combined several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent and control drug use: 
police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention, coordination of services with health and social service 
agencies, and development of the social infrastructure of formal and informal supervision groups in the housing 
authorities.” Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New 
York City Public Housing, 13 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol'y 415, 417 (2006). It is not clear this sort of multi-pronged 
effort, in which the effects of one policy might be contingent on the manner in which another is operationalized, can 
be used as a basis for drawing inferences about SQF. 
118 EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY, & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 105, at 153-54 (“Nor is it clear that investigatory stops 
help reduce the crime rate ….”). 
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Second, econometric studies of SQF’s effect on crime of the kind discussed above aim to 
isolate the marginal effect of the policy after controlling for all other relevant variables. In effect, 
they hold all else constant and then search for an effect of SQF on crime rates. But the 
assumption that ‘all else remains constant’ is an obvious artifice. A police force that foregoes 
SQF is likely to employ an alternative policing strategy that does not involve nonconsensual 
interventions or facially racial disparities in treatment. The marginal negative effect on crime-
control of shifting from SQF to an alternative modality of policing is likely to be smaller than the 
absolute effect of simply foregoing SQF entirely. A police force that chooses to forego SQF can 
redeploy the substantial personnel resources it demands for other uses.  
 
There are, moreover, other modalities of policing that are positively associated with 
crime control in rigorous empirical studies. Consider, for example, the robust empirical literature 
on “hot-spot policing,” a technique that has some parallels with SQF, but can be distinguished. 
Hot-spot policing involves “the application of police interventions at very small geographic units 
of analysis.”119 An impressive range of studies and meta-studies has demonstrated that the highly 
localized deployment of officers has a meaningful and statistically significant effect on crime 
rates.120  
 
Hot-spot policing and SQF have some similarities, but their differences are critical. First, 
there is a question of scale. SQF (as I use the term) involves tens or hundreds of thousands of 
arrests. Hot-spot policing does not require similarly massive deployments. Hence, the one study 
of an existing SQF policy to consider the question concluded that deployments tended to occur 
across areas that were too large to be characterized as “hot spots” as that term is technically 
used.121 Hence, even if the distinction in scale between SQF and hot-spot policing is hard to 
quantify, in practice it seems easy enough to draw.122 Second, hot-spot policing does not require 
stops, let alone frisks or arrests as a central element. There is evidence that “increased police 
presence alone” dampens crime rates, but the “strongest” impact is associated with “situational 
prevention” strategies, which “disrupt situational dynamics that allow crime to occur,” for 
example by “razing abandoned buildings.”123 One study of street stops at “microgeographic” hot 
spots examined in one week increments in New York generated reductions in crime, but 
                                                
119 ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES 9 (2010). More generally, proactive 
policing of various kinds (not necessarily involving stops) is also associated with crime-control effects. Charis E. 
Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 62 (2010).  
120 Cody W. Telep and David Weisburd, What is Known About the Effectiveness of Police Practices in Reducing 
Crime and Disorder?, 15 POLICE Q. 331, 333-34 (2012) (“The evidence for hot-spot policing is particularly strong 
….”). For exemplary studies using randomized and controlled experiments, see Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. 
Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008); 
Anthony Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Control Experiment, 37 
Criminology 541 (1999). 
121 Fagan & Geller, supra note 10, at 79-80. This factor can also be used in inapposite and illogical ways. Id. at 85 
(noting that “High Crime Area” was often provided as a justification for stops in public housing putatively targeting 
trespassers, but without any explanation of why the suspicion of trespass arose). 
122 In Part I.B infra, I develop a catalog of costs associated with SQF. Many of these costs flow from the sheer 
volume and concentration of stops. Because hot-spot policing is more focused, many of these criticisms do not apply 
to it. This is another reason to distinguish hot-spot policing and SFQ qua urban policing strategies. 
123 Telep & Weisbburd, supra note 120, at 333-34l; accord Braga & Bond, supra note 120, at 599 (reported results 
from a controlled, randomized study in Lowell, MA, and suggesting that the strongest crime-prevention benefits 
were driven by situational strategies that attempted to modify the criminal opportunity structure at crime and 
disorder hot-spot locations”). 
  - 17 - 
 
  
cautioned that “evidence suggests that crime prevention can be achieved without resorting to an 
unrestricted SQF policy.”124 In this New York data, moreover, SQF was pursued “at the 
expense” of other strategies, leaving open questions about the “potential of other policing 
strategies.”125  
 
Hot spot policing plainly requires more officers. It is important to emphasize that my 
argument here solely concerns the style of policing, and not the sheer volume of officers 
deployed.126 But increasing stops or arrests, by contrast, do not appear to be a necessary 
component of hot-spot policing. Indeed, in one leading study, the authors noted approvingly that 
officers in the treatment condition (i.e., engaged in hot-spot policing) were not evaluated on their 
stop count, but rather were held “accountable for reducing citizen calls for service and for 
ameliorating social and physical incivilities in targeted hot-spot areas.” 127  A recent 
metaanalysis of 19 studies of hot-spot policing separately examined the effects of two distinct 
versions of that policy that involved either increasing the volume of traditional policing or using 
a problem-solving approach.128 Three of eight studies or the traditional policing model found 
small positive effects on crime reduction. But the overall mean effect size of problem-oriented 
hot spot policing was twice the effect size of the traditional policing model.129 It would seem that 
the choice to simply increase traditional policing activities at hot spots is dominated in practice 
by problem-solving measures.  
 
The contrast between SQF and hot-spot policing usefully underscore a more general 
point: Policing is not a single, undifferentiated public good. Rather, policing takes several forms, 
pursuing diverse ends of crime-control, order-maintenance, and social provision, with divergent 
tools.130 Police forces now engaged in SQF have at other times, employed other, quite different 
approaches, which focus instead on service provision131 or community relations132 as well as 
prophylactic street policing. Some of these policies aim to reduce crime; others, such as 
community policing, seek to “build[] a reservoir of public support” to tap in moments of 
strain.133 These different services can be bundled in different ways. In at least some of the 
jurisdictions in which SQF is employed, neighborhoods subject to aggressive street policing do 
                                                
124 David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question and Frisk Practices Deter Crime? Evidence at Microunits of Space and 
Time, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 31, 48-49 (2015); id. at 47 (noting that in their estimate high-volume use of 
SFQ would produce “only a 2% decline in crime,” which they characterize as “relatively small”). 
125 Id. at 49-50. 
126 Cf. Steven D. Levitt, Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effects of police on crime: Reply, 92 
AM. ECON. REV. 1244, 1244 (2002) (presenting evidence of a “large negative impact of police on crime”). 
127 Braga & Bond, supra note 120, at 599. 
128 Anthony A. Braga et al. The Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Crime: An Updated Systemic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 640 (2014). 
129 Id. at 656. 
130 For an excellent survey of diverse views on the police function, see THE FUTURE OF POLICE (Jennifer Brown, ed. 
2014).  
131 JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT 
COMMUNITIES 200-26 (1968) (describing a “service style” of policing). 
132 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1598 (2002) (describing an 
effort by police in Chicago to build relations with African-American churches).  
133 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 247 (2006) (discussing 
community policing in Chicago in the early 1990s).  
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not necessarily receive high levels of other policing services.134 In Chicago, for example, 
African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods are subject to SQF on the one hand, but on the 
other hand experience substantially longer delays than nonminority neighborhoods when seeking 
police aid via 911 calls. 135  Policing is thus both under-supplied and over-provided 
simultaneously. 
 
Defenders of SQF therefore may well mislead when they equate SQF with a police force 
“focus[ing] its resources where people most need protection.” 136 Rather, it is both possible—and 
in fact often seems to be the case—that SQF is accompanied by serious deficiencies in other 
parts of the bundle of police services. Estimation of the margin costs of ending SQF must 
therefore account for the possibility of variance across these other elements of the police 
function.  
 
Third, the assumption of SQF’s advocates, particular in New York, has been that its 
benefits accrue to the minority residents of high crime neighborhoods more than they accrue 
to residents of low-crime neighborhoods.137 It is this assumption that might point toward a 
profitable comparison between SQF and affirmative action: Both are policies that 
disproportionately benefit African-American and Hispanic minorities. But consider another 
possibility: Since the 1960s, the fear of crime has been a concern that has powerfully 
mobilized white electorates.138 It may be that among the gains of SQF is a reduction in the 
fear of crime,139 and that this gain is diffused among the wider urban population. The latter, 
of course, is typically much larger than the urban subpopulation subject to SQF.  
 
Even assuming there is a substantial marginal crime-control gain in substituting SQF 
for the next-best policy,140 it is necessarily the case that whereas (predominantly minority) 
residents of impoverished neighborhoods experience both costs and benefits, whereas 
(predominantly white) non-residents of other neighborhoods experience only benefits (albeit 
in expectation at a much lower rate). There are also likely to be many more white non-
residents of targeted areas than minority non-residents. The former benefit from being able to 
access more of the city—a benefit that the latter do not obtain—as well as from a reduced 
fear of crime. Depending on the magnitude of these various costs and benefits for different 
racial groups, it is quite possible that the adoption of SQF might create larger net benefits for 
                                                
134 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 41-42 (2010) (noting disparate access to public-order 
resources in cities such as Los Angeles). 
135 Central Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 2013 Il App. (1st 123041, ¶ 4 (Nov. 13, 2013) (describing 
longer wait times for 911 calls in minority neighborhoods). 
136 McDonald, supra note 79.  
137 See sources cited supra in note 79. 
138 See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
230, 235 (2007); see also Dennis D. Loo & Ruth-Ellen, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The ‘Law and Order’ Issue of 
the 1960s, 5 WEST. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50, 50 (2004) (discussing origins of public concerns about crime in the 
1960s). 
139 Jonathan P. Jackson, A Psychological Perspective on Vulnerability in the Fear of Crime, 15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & 
L. 365 (2009). 
140 But see supra text accompanying notes 119 to 127 (suggesting that hot spot policing is better supported 
empirically as a crime-control measure than SQF). 
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the class of white nonresidents as a whole than for the class of minority residents of highly 
policed neighborhoods—even without accounting for the potential costs of SQF.141  
 
The claim that SQF disproportionately benefits minorities is an important part of the 
moral case in favor of the policy. Closer examination of the assumptions underlying the 
claim, however, uncovers its fragility. It is hardly clear that—even bracketing the costs of 
SQF—it is true that a disproportionate share of the social benefits of SQF run to minority 
communities. Much depends on the welfare effects from crime reductions and from 
mitigation of crime-related fears.  
 
The fourth and final reason for skepticism of the positive case for SQF based on its 
crime-control effects is not based on empirical data or calculations of welfarist 
consequences. Rather, it is moral in nature, and depends on a distinctive and likely 
controversial moral logic: the idea that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, 
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to 
acquire property by his own crime.”142 Applying that concededly raw intuition to the case of 
SQF reveals the following line of argument: The problem of violent crime to which SQF 
responds flows from the existence of neighborhoods of concentrated (and racialized) poverty. 
Although there are many forces molding the latter, governmental actors at the state and local 
level have a large share of responsibility. Those same governmental bodies (if not the exact same 
politicians143) also adopted SQF. Having exposed minority communities to the harm of high 
violent crime rates, governmental bodies cannot then “take advantage” of this wrong to seek a 
measure of legal and policy leeway that they otherwise would not have. At a minimum, they 
should elect the policing strategy that imposes the minimum burden on minority communities 
that as a result of persisting state policy have been subjected to concentrated poverty and high 
crime rates.  
 
The threshold premise of this argument—that states and localities bear a measure of 
responsibility for concentrated, minority poverty—has substantial support in the historical and 
empirical literature. To be sure, “macrostructural” forces such as the deindustrialization of 
central cities and the exit of some middle-class and wealth African-Americans have driven the 
growth of concentrated, racialized poverty. 144  But these forces have been magnified by 
                                                
141 What if African-American residents subject to SQF do not benefit from the policy and do not support it? If SQF 
nonetheless mitigates white fear of crime, the policy will have an unmitigated regressive distributive effect. Steven 
N. Durlauf. Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 ECON. J. F402, F412 (2006). 
142 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). 
143 In Chicago, the argument might well be personalized given the lengthy tenure of Richard M. Daley in office.  
144 Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME 
AND INEQUALITY 37, 42 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995). More recently, the financial crisis has 
deepened the effect of segregation. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American 
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 634 (2010) (“[T] he housing boom and the immense profits it generated 
frequently came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner suburbs who were targeted by 
specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national banks and subjected to discriminatory lending practices.”). 
The best historical case-study is Thomas Sugrue’s magnificent history of post-war Detroit, THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996). 
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“deliberate policy decisions to concentrate minorities and the poor in public housing.”145 In 
Chicago, for example, alderman and the mayor thwarted efforts from the 1940s onward to 
disperse African-Americans outside traditionally black neighborhoods.146 Across the country, 
zoning restrictions and permitting requirements have been extensively deployed to perpetuate 
racially “exclusionary” residential patterns.147 
 
 The implications of state involvement in the creation of concentrated racialized poverty 
depend on the sort of moral fault one attributes to a collective entity such as a municipality, the 
precise mix of state action and private actions responsible for residential segregation, and the 
extent to which any historical responsibility is mitigated by the passage of time and the burdens 
that remediation would impose on innocent third-parties.148 I do not aim to resolve that complex 
suite of questions here. Rather, my more limited claim is that a city’s claims on behalf of SQF 
must at a minimum be contextualized by its historical responsibility for the burdens imposed by 
concentrated poverty, particularly on the racial minorities whose efforts to move beyond that 
condition in search of employment and educational opportunities have so often been thwarted.149 
At an absolute minimum, it would seem appropriate to demand a heightened burden of proof for 
claims about the benefits of disparate crime-control measures tendered by the very entity 
responsible for racial segregation. At a minimum, the institutional author of racial segregation 
should do no further harm to minorities when it addresses the costs of such segregation. Having 
created the problem that SQF is intended to address, municipalities have no entitlement to a 
benefit of empirical doubt. More ambitiously, cities’ partial culpability for the underlying 
condition of concentrated poverty might justify special efforts to ensure that no policy response 
to crime imposed a disproportionate share of costs on the legatees of historical discrimination, or 
that denied them a disproportionate share of its benefits.  
 
* * * 
 
This section has examined the crime-control benefits of SQF. The evidence for those is 
surprisingly fragile. The case for thinking SQF has marginal benefits in comparison to a next-
                                                
145 Sampson & Wilson, supra note 144, at 43; see generally Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial 
Inequality Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 625, 649-51 
(2011) (analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation in the 
suburbs and urban cities).. Such policies also existed at the federal level. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). For a recent accounting in the 
legal scholarship, see Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical 
Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1955–56 (2015) (discussing the role of the Federal Housing 
Authority in fostering urban racial segregation). 
146 See ARNOLD HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960, at 23-24, 64-
68, 222-23 (1983) (discussing political resistance to the diffusion of public housing, motivated by opposition to 
racial integration); accord D. BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER: THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC 
HOUSING 85-86 (2009). Private violence also played a large role in Chicago. HIRSCH, supra, at 217-18. 
147 See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial 
Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888-89 (2006); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting 
Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1667-
73 (2013). 
148 An additional complication arises if a municipality that adopts SQF simultaneously pursues policies that either 
entrench or preserve concentrated minority poverty.  
149 On the difficulty of African-American exit from concentrated poverty via economic improvement, see MARY 
PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 24-27 (1999). 
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best policy option such as hot-spot policing is even more shaky. Accounting for the fear of 
crime, moreover, suggests that defenses of SQF as a form of affirmative action may well fail. 
Finally, an analysis based on the state’s historical responsibilities for the underlying conditions 
that motivate SQF suggests a need to view the state’s celebration of the policy’s benefits with a 
measure of skepticism. 
 
C. The Ecological and Dynamic Costs of SQF 
This section turns from SQF’s putative benefits to its costs. In my view, SQF has an 
intertwined set of individual and collective costs that largely (but not exclusively) sound in an 
equality-related rather than a Fourth Amendment register. My starting assumption is that SQF’s 
costs, no less than its benefits, cannot be understood detached from the historical origins of 
concentrated poverty. Nor can they be evaluated without thinking carefully about the ways in 
which SQF might perpetuate the underlying conditions of social and racial stratification into 
concentrated poverty. In short, rather than analyzing racial discrimination as a “single-point 
outcome,” I endorse the dominant emphasis in recent sociological scholarship on “modeling 
discrimination as a process” 150 rather than a discrete action or outcome. 
 
I identify eight pathways by which SQF can impose harms on individuals and 
communities defined by race. I began my analysis of costs by focusing on the immediate 
encounter between police and an individual. Having documented costs in that context, I then 
widen my lens to capture a diverse array of adverse spillovers from that immediate encounter, 
not only to the individual, but also for his or her social network, and (for racial minorities) his or 
her larger racial cohort. The latter effects of SQF, it should be noted, diffuse through social 
networks and families.151 Several critically depend upon “vicious circles”, or positive feedback 
mechanisms that entangle individual and neighborhood-level effects,152 often with regressive 
distributive consequences. More generally, it is plausible to view all eight causal pathways as 
intertwined and, to an extent, mutually reinforcing.  
 
First, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized that even brief stops and frisks have 
immediate and substantial costs. Chief Justice Warren described even a temporary police stop as 
“a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”153 In subsequent cases, however, the 
Court has tended to downplay the direct psychological and dignitary costs of being stopped.154  
 
But ethnographic data and qualitative studies demonstrate that Chief Justice Warren’s 
initial intuition was correct. The immediate toll of a nonconsensual police intrusion—even 
absent physical content or formal consequence—is quite substantial. Perhaps the best evidence 
                                                
150 Devah Pager and Hannah Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and 
Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 188 (2008). 
151 Because not all have been rigorously empirically tested, I will carefully identify what data obtains respecting 
each pathway. Where data is absent, I will offer (with appropriate caveats) reasoned hypotheses. 
152 Mitchell Duneier argues that “the black ghetto has been the site of vicious circles in which space plays a 
distinctive role.” MITCHELL DUNEIER, GHETTO: THE INVENTION OF A PLACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 223 (2016). I 
stress the role of neighborhood rather than ‘space’ in the following.  
153 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968). 
154 Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 338-39 (2013). 
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derives from a recent survey of 1,200 young men in New York. This found that contact with the 
police (primarily in the form of Terry stops) was consistently associated with persisting “stigma, 
trauma, anxiety and depression.”155 On reflection, it should be no surprise that these effects flow 
from a Terry stop. The latter is an unexpected encounter with heavily armed police, typically 
characterized by a sense of utter helplessness and s sharp fear of violence and deadly force.156 
This fear may be amplified by a worry of more prolonged detention, a real concern in a 
jurisdiction where police have arrest quotas to fill.157 This psychological toll is not immediately 
visible. It may be shameful even to admit. These are, perhaps, the least troubling explanations for 
why such costs have largely fallen out of judicial accounts of SQF.  
 
Second, a different, racial asymmetry afflicts judicial consideration of the risks of bodily 
harm attendant on a Terry stop. On the one hand, the Court has punctiliously attended to the risk 
of bodily harm to officers during a stop.158 On the other hand, the Court has been largely silent 
about the possibility that Terry stops expose the individual subject to police attention to a 
substantial risk of physical violence.159 Nor has it accounted for the possibility that these risks 
will be positively correlated with minority status. Recent empirical work by Roland Fryer using 
the Terry stop-related records of New York’s police found “large racial differences” in police use 
of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing, and pushing individuals into a wall or onto 
the ground.160 Even assuming perfectly compliant behavior, African-Americans were 21 percent 
more likely to experience force than whites.161 Given such large differentials in the use of force, 
it would hardly be surprising if a large proportion of the innocent minority residents of high-
crime neighborhood who are stopped and frisked objected to aggressive SQF even if it had 
public safety benefits that diffused to their benefit.162  
 
                                                
155 Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
2321 (2014).  
156 For a vivid account of the associated dignitary harms, see Nicholas K. Pert, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/ opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-
nypd.html (“Essentially, I incorporated into my daily life the sense that I might find myself up against a wall or on 
the ground with an officer's gun at my head.”). 
157 This may have been the case in New York. Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest 
Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-focuses-on-
claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (describing evidence that police officers were told to meet quotas). 
158 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (stressing the risk of harm to officers while characterizes 
the cost to those under the control of the officers of being physically moved as “minimal”). 
159 The Fourth Amendment provides limited protection from non-deadly force. The Court employs a loose standard 
to review excessive non-deadly force claims. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989). The “indeterminacy” 
of the standard undermines the risk of ex post liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or Bivens, both of which require a 
“clear” legal rule to be violated Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1140-41 (2008). Since Graham does not supply a “clear” rule, there is rarely tort liability for excessive non-deadly 
force. Id.  
160 Roland G. Fryer, Jr, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Uses of Force 3 (July 2016), 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf. Earlier work for increasing usage of disproportionate 
police force in minority neighborhoods, particularly when that minority was perceived as a demographic threat to a 
majority. Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867, 887-88 (2002) 
(discussing distributions of police force in New York City between the 1970s and the 1990s). 
161 Fryer, supra note 160, at 31.  
162 See infra text accompanying notes 299 to 302 (addressing the argument that SQF is justified because of minority 
community support). 
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Third, the effects of Terry stops on the individuals directly subject to police attention do 
not expire when their participants part ways. Rather, negative experiences with the police breed 
cynicism about the law, an unwillingness to invoke the police’s aid, and a diminished proclivity 
to comply with the law or cooperate with legal authorities. The connections between negative 
police treatment and strongly aversive views of the police are empirically well grounded, albeit 
not in contexts where SQF has been implemented.163 But studies from the specific cities at issue 
here demonstrate vividly that both intensive street policing has lingering effects on the 
dispositions and beliefs of the population at issue.  
 
For instance, a recent qualitative study of young men living in three high-crime 
neighborhoods in Philadelphia found that less than 10 percent were willing to call the police “in 
any circumstances,” in part because many had themselves had negative experiences with the 
police in the past.164 Tellingly, the same study also found resentment directed at police because 
of their failure to respond to 911 calls in a timely fashion.165 Police, that is, not seen reflexively 
in a negative light: It is intrusive and disrespectful treatment, coupled with a failure to provide 
noncoercive public-safety, that elicit negative perceptions of the police. This study, however, 
focused on negative experiences of police, rather than the mere fact of being stopped. Although 
the Philadelphia study suggests that young men in particular perceive police contact generally as 
negative, it does not test for different effects of any police contact.166 In contrast, a recent study 
in New York, examining young subjects in areas affected by SQF, found that increasing 
experience of stops (whether negative or positive experiences) diminished perceptions of police 
legitimacy. 167  A larger body of empirical findings from the United States and beyond 
                                                
163 Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, 
and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY, 253, 276-78 (2004) (“To effectively deal with racial distrust 
of the police in the minority community it is important to regulate not only the selection of the people whom the 
police stop, but also the manner in which they conduct stops as well.”). Sherry Colb has raised the concern that such 
“targeting harm” is unlikely to arise because individuals stopped do not know the police’s motivations. Sherry F. 
Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1500 
(1996). After Colb made this argument, Epp and colleagues demonstrated that minority motorists subject vehicular 
stops based on minor regulatory offense are quite aware of the fact that they have been stopped when a similarly 
situated white motorists would not have been stopped, and make strong negative judgments of the police as a result. 
EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY, & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 105, at 117-18.  
164 Patrick Carr, Laura Napolitano, & Jessica Keating, We Never Call the Cops and Here Is Why: A Qualitative 
Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 445, (2007). A parallel 
result was obtained in a study in St. Louis. Rod K. Brunson, Police Don't Like Black People: African-American 
Young Men's Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 71-72 (2007).  
165 Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, supra note 164, at 459; accord Robert Sampson & Dawn Jelgum Bartusch, Legal 
Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & 
SOC'Y REV. 777, 793 (1998) (finding “perceptions of injustice and alienation from police” in Chicago neighborhoods 
of concentrated poverty, but rejecting the hypothesis that this stems from a “black subculture of deviance”). Alice 
Goffman’s recent ethnography of impoverished Philadelphia confirms this. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: 
FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). 
166 A recent study in St. Louis, MO, using a quantitative methodology, similarly found that “two-thirds of the young 
men [in the study] said the police are almost never easy to talk to, nearly half said the police are almost never 
polite.” Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Policing in the United States, 46 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 622 (2006). These results suggest that it cannot be assumed that most stops are perceived as 
positive or neutral. 
167 Tom Tyler, Jeff Fagan, & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young 
Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMP. L. STUD. 751, 772, figs 3 & 4 (2014). 
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demonstrates that diminished police legitimacy is associated with a diminished disposition to 
follow the law and a lesser willingness to cooperate with police.168 
 
Relatedly, a high volume of stops concentrated in a specific geographically locale can 
create a vicious-circle feedback loop that works from individual legal cynicism to increased 
collective victimization, and back again. When SQF is perceived as being distributed on racial 
grounds (perhaps because African-Americans and Hispanics are in fact at a much greater a risk 
of being stopped than whites169), cynicism about the law and police is likely to be sharpened in 
minority communities. At the margin, violations of the law become more frequent.170 As the 
expected risk of being victimized rises, therefore, it seems that residents of heavily policed areas 
become less willing to proactively reach out to police. This further lowers the expected cost of 
criminality, rather than alleviating it as SQF’s advocates hoped.171 More crime in turn leads to 
more aggressive SQF, which starts the cycle anew. A version of this dynamic has been termed 
the “Ferguson effect,” a term that captures the possibility that high-visibility instances of police 
misconduct lead to increases in crime because of reduced confidence in police or because of 
increased risk-averseness on police’s part. Evidence for the Ferguson effect, however, is weak 
and confined to certain crimes in certain cities.172 If further evidence were to emerge of such an 
effect, it would nevertheless strength the argument developed here.  
 
Fourth is another vicious circle related to legal cynicism: If minorities have consistently 
negative views of the police, and respond to stops accordingly, police may come to anticipate 
more resistance from those minorities. Shared police expectations of a greater risk of African-
American violence in response to a police stop is one potential explanation for the higher rates of 
force for black suspects that Fryer finds in the New York SQF data.173 Appearances, in this way, 
influence realities.174 The perception of racial disproportionality in stops hence influences 
individual residents’ behavior, which in the aggregate creates racial differences in violence by 
                                                
168 For a summary of research into police legitimacy, see Stephen J. Schulhofer et. al., American Policing at A 
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 335, 
338 (2011) (“[C]ompliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped 
not by the threat of force or the fear of consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens' beliefs that law 
enforcement agencies are legitimate.”). 
169 See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY, & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 105, at 117 (“African-Americans and Latinos have 
developed and share with each other an extensive body of knowledge about police behavior and police stops.”); 
accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED, POLICING THE LOVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 54-57 (2011). 
170 See William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213, 1217 (1998) (“If the police and, through 
them, the criminal justice system, come to be seen as illegitimate, the norms of law-abiding behavior could unravel, 
with the streets becoming less safe, not more so.”) 
171 See Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based 
Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 105 (2012) (“In communities with high levels of intersubjectively shared 
cynicism of police misbehavior and the perceived irrelevance of legal rules, violence is higher.”). 
172 The best study of which I am aware is David C. Pyrooz, et al., Was there a Ferguson Effect in large U.S. cities?, 
46 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 7-8 (2016) (finding an effect only for homicide and robbery, and only in cities with large 
impoverished minority communities).  
173 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening 
Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321-28 (2002) (finding subjects, instructed to act as 
officers, were quicker to use force against blacks than whites). 
174 This is an instance of what Adam Samaha calls “[a]ppearance driving reality.” Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for 
the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1577 (2012). 
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police. This of course merely strengthens minorities’ negative expectations of police.175 Hence, 
large racial disparities in the physical harms associated with SQF can be reconciled with the 
“nearly uniform support for the principle of equal treatment” found in polling data.176 
 
Fifth, just as legal cynicism leads to higher victimization rates, so too can the carceral 
consequences of SQF. “[M]ore punitive police enforcement and parole surveillance” leads to a 
higher frequency of repeat admissions from a given neighborhood, which “begets more 
incarceration,” which in turn begets more crime.177 To the extent SQF does not result in arrests, 
of course, this dynamic is blunted.  
 
Sixth, SQF might solidify stereotypical assumptions about the correlation of race and 
criminality. Where the neighborhoods targeted for SQF are predominantly African-American 
and Hispanic, SQF is likely to strength the widely shared perception of a connection between 
race and crime.178 Careful empirical studies have demonstrated that the racial identity of a 
neighborhood’s inhabitants already provides a cue for people’s estimates of its disorderly 
character179 and its crime rate.180 SQF, especially when explicitly justified on the basis of black 
criminality, works as an official imprimatur upon this popular stereotype. And by instantiating 
state policy on the basis of that spurious correlation, it deepens and ratifies racial stereotypes that 
long predate any known disparity in crime rates, and that depend not on empirics, but rather on 
profound (and invidious) assumptions about racial differences.181 Empirical evidence already 
suggests that suspects with darker skin pigmentation are likely to identified as criminal182 and 
punished more severely183 than similarly situated lighter-toned suspects. It may also be that the 
tighter perceived correlation between race and criminality reinforces residential segregation, by 
“mark[ing] off ‘black’ from ‘white’ neighborhoods.”184  
 
                                                
175 The expert report in the New York litigation gestures at this dynamic when it explains why propensity score 
matching is infeasible as a measure of testing for discriminatory motives. Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 97-98.  
176 Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 
299, 308 (2006).  
177 Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003). 
178 See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (exploring the ways in which at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
policymakers in Northern cities began linking crime to African-Americans on the basis of genetic and 
predispositional arguments). 
179 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social 
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319-20 (2004) (finding that perceptions of disorder 
in a neighborhood were better predicted by the racial composition of a neighborhood than by actual disorder). 
180 Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black neighbors, higher crime? The role of racial stereotypes. 107 AM. J. SOC. 
717, 718 (2001) (finding “that the percentage of a neighborhood’s black population, particularly you black men, is 
significantly associated with perceptions of the severity of a neighborhood’s crime problems”). 
181 Annabelle Lever makes the related and important point that race-based policing often “reflects racist attitudes, 
institutions and habits while obscuring its contribution to them.” Annabelle Lever, Why Racial Profiling is Hard to 
Justify: A Response to Risse and Zechkauser, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 94, 97 (2005) (emphases omitted).  
182 Travis Dixon & Keith Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of 
the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 1555, 1555-56 (2005). 
183 Jennifer L. Hochschild & Vesla Mae Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order, 86 SOC. 
FORCES 643, 644, (2007). 
184 ANDERSON, supra note 134, at 42.  
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 Seventh, another probable (if untested) effect of SQF is a dampening of civil participation 
by residents of affected neighborhoods in ways that, over time, conduce to diminished collective 
political power. Important recent work has demonstrated empirically that contact with the 
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a substantial and statistically 
significant effect on trust in government.185 In one national sample, “[t]he probability of voting 
declined by 8 percent for those who have been stopped.”186 Once again, there is a potent vicious 
circle in operation here: SQF is a form of policing that allocates most of its costs to minorities 
living in concentrated poverty. But the downstream effect of a high stop rate is that roughly one 
in ten of those subjected to SQF become less likely to vote. Like felon disenfranchisement laws, 
SQF thus has the effect of sapping low-income minority communities’ influence on public policy 
and distributions of public goods,187 even as it purports to empower those communities.   
 
Eighth, and finally is yet another potential aggregate effect—this time upon the level of 
“collective efficacy” within a neighborhood. Developed by the Harvard sociologist Robert 
Sampson, the concept of collective efficacy involves “the linkage of mutual trust and the shared 
willingness to intervene.”188 In repeated studies, high levels of collective efficacy have been 
found to boost “neighborhoods[’ ability] to realize the common values of residents and maintain 
effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in violence” and in 
particular homicide.189 Although there is no study of the effect of SQF on levels of collective 
efficacy, there is little reason to think it will be positive. If contact with the police breeds legal 
cynicism, intracommunal violence, anxiety, and an unwillingness to engage politically, it is hard 
to see how it could foster collective efficacy. If that is so, SQF suppresses a key determinant of 
public safety within neighborhoods.  
 
Many of these eight effects likely endure across generations. Most impoverished African-
American youth, as well as a “significant” proportion of middle-income ones, live in urban 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty of the kind subject to SQF.190 SQF is pivotal in the 
formation of many minority children’s understandings of their status and possibilities in 
America, an effect that is compounded because one in four black children already experiences 
                                                
185 LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 77, at 150-51 (presenting a range of tests of trust in government). 
186 Id. at 222-23. In a separate article, Lerman and Weaver find parallel results in a New York sample. Amy E. 
Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying Out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action, 651 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 205 (2014) (finding in a study of New York “witnessing stops that occur with 
little justification and that feature physical force can make people feel occupied and powerless, and can incentivize 
disengagement with government”). 
187 Todd Clear, The Effect of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 CRIM. & JUST. 97, 116 (2008). 
188 Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood effects, causal mechanisms, and the social structure of the city, in ANALYTIC 
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 227, 232 (P. Demeulenare, ed., 2011).  
189 Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, supra note 93, at 918; Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, & Stephen W. 
Raudenbush, Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 517, 551 (2001) (finding that measures of lower collective efficacy in a neighborhood independently 
predict increased homicide risk); Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Thomas Gannon-Rowley, Assessing 
‘Neighborhood Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 457 (2002) 
(same).  
190 Orlando Patterson, The Social and Cultural Matrix of Black Youth, in THE CULTURAL MATRIX: UNDERSTANDING 
BLACK YOUTH 45, 47 (O. Patterson & Ethan Fosse, eds., 2015). 
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parental incarceration.191 To think that SQF’s structural harms will be transient, therefore, is 
rather optimistic.  
 
This is a long list. Its items, though, should not be viewed in isolation. All of these 
pathways generate costs concentrated on the minority individuals and communities in which 
SQF is imposed. Impoverished minority individuals, and through them their communities, 
become more demoralized, alienated, anxious, crime-ridden, and politically powerless. The net 
effect of SQF’s eight costs, therefore, is singular: It is to maintain and even deepen social and 
geographic schisms that separate neighborhoods and racial groups. SQF therefore cannot be 
understood as merely an individual-level intervention. It sets in motion a range of important 
social processes, largely detrimental to the shared interests of a neighborhood and a racial group, 
in ways that reiterate and recapitulate extant racial and social hierarchies.  
 
These dynamics, finally, may help explain the surprising lack of empirical evidence of 
crime reduction from SQF.192 At an aggregate level, communities subject to SQF are likely to 
see their political efficacy, their collective efficacy, and their shared commitment to the law 
wither. One effect of these changes is an expected increase in levels of crime. This may offset 
whatever gains the direct application of SQF achieves partially or in full. SQF, in short, is a 
short-term panacea that in the medium-term may well prove self-defeating. 
 
D. The Distinctive Moral Wrong of SQF  
This Part has provided a definition and analysis of the positives and negatives of SQF 
with the aim of refashioning the case against SQF. Rather than cabining the inquiry by imposing 
artificial constitutional categories at the threshold, I have identified both individual and 
neighborhood-level costs and benefits. With both positives and negatives in hand, it is possible to 
recapitulate the argument against SQF in a more nuanced and acute form. To be sure, in the 
absence of precise quantification of both costs and benefits, that argument necessarily has a 
provisional aspect. I have no proof that the policy’s costs exceed its benefits. Nevertheless, I 
view the weakness of benefit-related evidence and the accumulation of cost-related evidence as 
sufficiently clear to suggest that a working account of the distinctive moral wrong of SQF is 
feasible.  
 
The core of the case against SQF is dynamic and ecological in character. It rests on the 
policy’s effect not just on the specific persons stopped by policy, but on the dynamic role that 
SQF plays in the social and racial stratifications concatenated with urban residential segregation. 
It is an argument, moreover, that proceeds without making any assumption of racial animus or 
individual officer fault.  
 
In the early 1990s, SQF was adopted as a response to rising violent crime associated with 
minority-dominated neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. In that respect, it was 
at its origin a response to an unexpected externality from the urban residential segregation that 
had been promoted by state actors from World War II onward. Local and state officials might 
                                                
191 SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON BOOM: MASS INCARCERATION AND 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 41 (2014). 
192See supra Part I.B.2.  
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have taken another path. 193  From the 1960s onwards, historian Elizabeth Hinton has 
demonstrated, national and local politics gradually “blended opportunity, development, and 
training programs of the War on Poverty with the surveillance, patrol, and detention programs of 
the War on Crime.”194 By the 1980s, however, the War on Crime “would completely supplant” 
Great Society antipoverty programs as a solution to urban discontent.195 Noncoercive solutions, 
in short, had already been tabled by the time the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was in full flush.196 Nevertheless, the policy response to that crime-wave has had ironically 
limited crime-control related payoff, while at the same time ratifying racial stereotypes, 
emasculating minority communities politically, and exacerbating their social and political 
weaknesses. Especially given the backdrop of municipal policies that consciously enabled and 
entrenched the urban ghetto, this policy choice was a morally problematic one: It was, in effect a 
choice by the state to exacerbate a form of racial stratification for which the state itself bears 
large moral (if not constitutional) responsibility.  
 
On this account, SQF is one link in a larger “process”197 of social and racial stratification 
in ways that extend well beyond the discrete effects of an isolated encounter between one officer 
and one resident.198 Given its exiguous benefits (shared by society) and its multifarious costs 
(largely concentrated within already impoverished minority communities), it is hard to imagine 
that SQF would have anything but regressive distributive effects as between racial groups.199 On 
the assumption that my judgments about the relative magnitude of costs and benefits are 
sustained, I believe that SQF can fairly be characterized as “a systematic and institutional 
phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and the presumption of black and brown 
criminality.”200  
 
Given this characterization, I resist claims that the problem of race in policing is a 
distraction, and that it would be better to focus reforming energies on (say) the problem of mass 
incarceration201 or structural inequality.202 SQF—even absent any racial animus—cannot be 
                                                
193 Accord RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 161 (1997) (arguing that greater expenditures on police 
is always an alternative to racial profiling). 
194 Elizabeth Hinton, ‘A War Within Our Boundaries’: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral 
State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 101-02 (2015).  
195 Id. at 111. Indeed, the larger a city’s black population, the more it spent on policing through the 1970s. Pamela 
Irving Jackson & Leo Carroll, Race and the War on Crime: The Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Police 
Expenditures in 90 non-Southern U.S. Cities, 46 AM. SOC. J. 290, 302-03 (1981).  
196 Cf. DUNEIER, supra note 152, at 223 (noting that African-Americans “ghettos,” as he calls them, are still 
characterized by a policy of “withholding resources and opportunities for poor blacks”).  
197 Pager & Shepherd, supra note 150, at 188. 
198 Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and 
Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 118 (2000) (“[S]ocial stratification is constituted through 
features of (1) social structure (institutions or practices) and (2) social meaning (stories or reasons).”). 
199 See ZIMRING, CITY THAT BECAME SAFE, supra note 112, at 149 (“[A]ggressiveness in policing is a costly strategy 
because it imposes real disadvantages on exactly the minority poor who can least afford additional handicaps.”). 
200 Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study 
and Practice of Punishment, 44 L & SOC. REV. 695, 701 (2010). 
201 R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594-58 (2003) 
(arguing that “the social harms of incarceration … are likely to be underappreciated in the racial profiling debate”). 
202 In a very rich analysis, Mathias Risse and Richard Zechhauser posit a form of profiling that has large crime-
control gains, and then argue that “much of the harm ostensibly done by profiling” should be ascribed to “systematic 
racism rather than acts of profiling.” Mathias Risse & Richard Zechhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
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separated from larger processes of subordination along social and racial lines, and efforts to 
distinguish the two phenomena are deeply misguided. Equally beside the point are claims that 
SQF is based on an accurate generalization about racial minorities’ criminality. 203  Such 
background regularities are themselves functions of state action (given the state’s role in 
perpetuating racialized concentrated poverty, which is in turn correlated with crime). A policy 
choice that reinforces rather than dissipates the force of that generalization is hardly entitled to 
deference based on its putative accuracy.204  
 
A legal remedy might not be able to capture all of the diverse causal pathways I have 
identified here. But a legal remedy should nonetheless respond in part to SQF’s distinctive moral 
wrong by identifying those instances of policing choice that have the least positive effect on 
security with the largest stratification related spillovers. It is this question of the aptitude of 
constitutional doctrine and its subconstitutional counterpart in disparate-impact law to which I 
now turn. 
 
II. Street Policing and the Limits of Constitutional Doctrine  
This Part turns to the core doctrines of constitutional law invoked and applied in 
challenges to SQF—the Fourth Amendment law associated with Terry and the Equal Protection 
Clause doctrine that coalesces around Feeney. I argue that there is a mismatch between these 
doctrinal vehicles and the core normative challenge posed by SQF, as articulated in Part I, which 
renders them ill-suited to accounting for the normative challenges of SQF. Thinking about the 
costs and benefits of SQF in terms of Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection law reveals a 
troublingly asymmetrical gap cutting across both doctrinal structures: Fourth Amendment law 
and Equal Protection law alike employ narrow transactional frames to tally the costs imposed by 
state action to traditionally subordinate minorities, but are periodically open to dynamic and 
ecological effects in ways that serve to obscure or exculpate harms to racial minorities.  
 
To see the mismatch between current constitutional doctrine and SQF programs in a 
nutshell, consider a simple hypothetical. Imagine a police force in which every officer had 
internalized both Terry and Feeney. Each officer, in consequence, understood that she could not 
make a nonconsensual street stop without the relevant reasonable articulable suspicion of 
criminality, and that she could not make that stop “because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’”205 the 
perceived racial identity of the individual to be stopped. What would change in the actual 
practice of SQF? Would the concerns about the volume and racial disparities in stops be 
assuaged? The short answer is probably not. Consistent with the weak Terry rule, it may well be 
possible for a police force to conduct a very large volume of stops. And consistent with Feeney, 
those stops might be constitutional valid even if they were distributed in a way that deepens 
                                                                                                                                                       
131, 145 (2004). My argument here is aimed at showing this claim of separation, however, plausible in their 
hypothesized framework, does not hold in the world, and that the benefits of eliminating SQF would not (as they put 
it) be “comparatively modest.” Id. at 149. Similarly it is not the case that “African American communities … incur 
short-term costs while benefiting in the long run” from SQF. Id. at 163.  
203 See sources cited supra in note 79. 
204 Even our impoverished Equal Protection doctrine, see infra Part II, does not overtly treat accuracy as a sufficient 
justification for the use of racial classifications. David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 
119.  
205 Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
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racial stratification. Indeed, racial disparities are particularly likely to persist if police believe 
that African-Americans commit a disproportionate share of offenses and thus merit a higher per-
capita rate of street stops. The application of conventional constitutional doctrine under the 
Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, is consistent with preservation of 
SQF at its present volume and as characterized by current racial disparities.  
 
I consider first the Fourth Amendment and then Equal Protection doctrine, in each case 
emphasizing the parallel gaps revealed by their application to the problem of street policing.  
 
A. The Limits of Fourth Amendment Doctrine  
The Fourth Amendment law of street stops cannot impose a meaningful constraint upon 
SQF in minority neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. To the contrary, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine systematically lowers the cost of such stops in comparison to others 
conducted outside the distinctive urban ecologies of SQF. To the extent that the Fourth 
Amendment law of street policing takes account of changing social and institutional contexts, 
though, it is thoroughly asymmetrically.  
 
 The “reasonable articulable suspicion” predicates for a Terry stop and a related frisk are 
not demanding hurdles. They focus solely on the evidentiary predicate for a stop, and ignore the 
manner in which a stop is conducted. Terry, that is, takes no account of variance in the potential 
dignitary and demoralization externalities imposed by aggressive or demeaning police behavior. 
Moreover, the Court has not defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” beyond warning that an 
officer must be able to articulate something more than a “hunch.”206 The Court has rather 
underscored that this evaluation be made under the “totality of the circumstances.”207 This gives 
officers a wide an array of predicate facts to choose from when making their case. With one 
exception, officers’ subjective beliefs and knowledge are hence available as bases for a Terry 
stop,208 even though such subjective factors are not relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis 
in other cases.209 The exception is also telling: Even where race is the real (i.e., subjective) basis 
of the stop, the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy where alternative factual grounds for 
reasonable articulable suspicion exist.210 
 
Quite apart from this peculiar gerrymandering of the legally relevant grounds for 
evaluating the quality of a stop, officers’ discretion is rarely in practice subject to rigorous 
adversarial testing in a subsequent criminal adjudication. Where the sole witnesses to a stop are 
the suspect and arresting officers, there is little reason to think the resulting testimonial contest 
                                                
206 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that 
reasonable articulable suspicion “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard”). 
207 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-32 (1990). 
208 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) (“Among the circumstances that can give rise to 
reasonable suspicion are the agent's knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the 
characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.”). 
209 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Our cases have repeatedly rejected a subjective approach, asking 
only whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.” (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398 (2006)). 
210 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting “any argument that the constitutional reasonableness 
of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers”). 
  - 31 - 
 
  
will result in accurate outcomes. Police have a strong incentive to color the facts in their favor, or 
even outright lie.211 A recent ethnographic account of the Chicago criminal courts, for example, 
paints a bleak picture of judges acting “overtly racist ways in court, mocked defendant’s black-
sounding names or used bastardized Ebonics to imitate the voices of defendants, families and 
victim,” judges who routinely “laughed at the fabrication of police reports as if it were a novelty, 
rather than an abuse of power.”212 Chicago’s pathologies might be extreme. But it is hard to 
imagine such practices are wholly absent from other large metropolitan courts systems. In many 
urban jurisdictions, therefore, there will be little effectual incentive for officers to comply with 
Terry’s meager epistemic exhortation.  
 
Nevertheless, the general trend in judicial reworkings of the Terry has been deflationary. 
I will just give one example, as it happens one that is particularly relevant to SQF. Whereas the 
Terry Court allowed the stop and frisk only when an office suspected crime was “afoot,”213 
subsequent cases extended that power to instances in which a crime has been completed.214 
While seemingly innocuous and sensible, this subtle shift in practice dramatically expands police 
discretion. Under Terry, the constellation of facts that might be invoked to justify a stop was 
bounded by what an officer could observe at a specific moment in time. Now, an officer can rely 
on a far greater universe of historical facts, available through a police forces’ index of suspect 
descriptions, to support reasonable articulable suspicion. In a handful of controversial cases, 
descriptions identifying African-American suspects have been employed to conduct blanket 
searches. In the controversial case of Brown v. City of Oneonta, for example, a description of a 
black male suspect provoked Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non-white 
persons,” including women, encountered on the streets.215 Even absent the broad search at issue 
in Brown, a large enough pool of suspect descriptions (as is likely to be the case in large cities) 
means that police discretion to stop becomes orders of magnitude larger than the authority 
defined in Terry.216 
 
                                                
211 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1040 
(1996). 
212 Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleave, Chicago’s Racist Cops and Racist Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2016, at A27, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/opinion/chicagos-racist-cops-and-racist-courts.html; see also NICOLE 
GONZALEZ VAN CLEAVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 146-
53 (2016) (discussing perjury and abuse by police).  
213 Terry, 392 U.S. at 31; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (stating “[b]ased upon that 
whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity.”). In some instances, the Court has used language that suggests some resistance 
to settling on a specific quantum of suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than 
preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for 
making the stop.”). 
214 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). 
215 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Bela August Walker, The Color of Crime: The Case Against 
Race-Based Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 673 (2003) (describing other cases of blanket searches 
for black suspects, and noting the absence of even anecdotal evidence of the same happening for white suspects). 
216 Further discretion arises when police use predictive algorithms, such as PredPol, to forecast crime patterns. See 
Erica Goode, Sending the Police before There's a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html. 
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Subsequent refinements to the Terry regime have rendered SQF more attractive relative 
to other ways of deploying policing resources. As the late William Stuntz noted, criminal 
procedure rules can act as “subsidies … making some kinds of … law enforcement cheaper” 
than others.217 Stuntz applied this logic to make a comparison between “policing street markets,” 
which is “cheap,” for the police, and the more expensive regulation of indoor, upscale drug 
markets.218 His point, though, can be extended to the neighborhood level. 
For a parallel differential arises between neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and 
areas of comparative wealth because of two Fourth Amendment precedents. First, the Court in 
Illinois v. Wardlow held that mere presence in a “high crime neighborhood,” and more 
particularly “an area of heavy narcotics trafficking” was “relevant” to the legality of a Terry 
stop.219 Evidence from New York’s SQF practice also demonstrates that this term is “vulnerable 
to subjective and highly contextualized interpretations.”220 This may be of particular concern to 
the extent that an increasing proportion of minorities tends to create a belief of disorderliness and 
criminality, as multiple studies show, 221  Wardlow creates an incentive to target minority 
neighborhoods. Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a “high crime area” is to be 
identified or bounded, Wardlow explicitly subsidizes police activity in neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty in comparison to wealthy neighborhoods. 
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Streiff222 creates an incentive for 
officers to target for stops populations likely to have a higher rate of bench warrants. In Streiff, 
the arresting officer was conducting a stakeout of a house where drug sales were suspected to 
happen. He saw Strieff leave the house and stopped him, despite lacking reasonable articulable 
suspicion. Partly as a result of what the state conceded to be an illegal stop, the officer asked 
Streiff for identification. Upon checking with his dispatcher, the officer learned of an outstanding 
warrant for Streiff and arrested him. A search incident to arrest found methamphetamine and 
drug paraphernalia.223 The issue before the Court was whether this evidence should be excluded 
as fruit of the initial illegal stop. Writing for five Justices, Justice Thomas said no. Characterizing 
the initial unlawful stop as “negligent” and a “good-faith” mistake,224 the Court found that the 
search-incident-to-arrest that had produced the narcotics to be “sufficiently attenuated by the pre-
existing arrest warrant.”225 Hence, the evidence found during the search incident to arrest was not 
subject to exclusion in Streiff’s criminal adjudication.226  
 
                                                
217 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (2006).  
218 William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1821 (1998). 
219 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
220 Fagan & Geller, supra note 10, at 79. See also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime 
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion 
Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1609-18 (2008) (“[W]hat is termed a ‘high-crime area’ can differ from case to 
case, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”). 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 179 to 180. 
222 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
223 These facts are taken from the majority opinion. Id. at 2060. 
224 Id. at 2063. 
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
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As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, “[o]utstanding warrants are surprisingly 
common.”227 A recent ethnography of misdemeanor courts in New York illustrates how courts 
and prosecutors generate a large volume of outstanding warrants for failures to appear at 
repeatedly rescheduled hearings, and then seek dispositions with little effect other than to 
facilitate later arrests.228 In Streiff, Justice Sotomayor did not contextualize the use of outstanding 
warrants in the SQF context. Rather, she cited evidence gathered by the Justice Department in 
Ferguson, MO, and explained that the “astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to 
stop people without cause,” and flagged that “it is no secret that people of color are 
disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny.”229 Police, indeed, have long been cognizant of 
the strategic potential for outstanding warrant-checks during street stops and have strategically 
exploited it.230  
The decision in Streiff creates a new incentive for police to engage in “negligent” 
stops,231 lacking even with the minimal accouterments of reasonable articulable suspicion, in 
order to check for warrants. This incentive becomes more powerful as the expected number of 
such outstanding warrants in a neighborhood increases. Here then is yet another incentive 
pressing police to focus street patrols on neighborhoods of concentrated poverty: Even if they 
cannot muster the minimal evidentiary predicate of Terry, officers have a sure-fire way of 
showing ‘progress,’ simply by making illegal stops and arresting based on either outstanding 
warrants or contraband found during a search incident to arrest. Streiff allows officers to employ 
stops even absent Terry suspicion and demonstrate ‘success.’ 
Decisions such as Wardlow and Streiff mean that current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence systematically tilts in favor of SQF. The doctrinal framework at work in these 
cases minimizes both proximate and distant harms to individuals stopped. It also ignores the 
ecological harms and dynamic stratification effects associated with SQF. Indeed, it seems fair to 
say that the vocabulary of the Fourth Amendment does not at present contain the resources even 
to account for those harms, let alone hold them in the balance with Terry stops’ positive, crime-
control effects. One indication of this is that Justice Sotomayor’s comments about the ecological 
context of street policing were so striking, and so dissonant from the normative verbiage of the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, that they generated media attention.232 If the mere fact a 
Justice is cognizant of the larger policy context in which a legal question arises stimulates the 
chattering classes into action, it is because the modal Fourth Amendment decision is hermetically 
detached from the distinctive ecological and dynamic costs flowing from urban policing.  
                                                
227 Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor. J., dissenting).  
228 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 659 (2014). 
229 Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor. J., dissenting). 
230 The link between Terry stops and outstanding warrants is not a new one. In the late 1990s, New York police 
realized that quality-of-life stops could be leveraged into frequent arrests that removed many from the streets. 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 341 & n.210 
(1998) (describing Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s endorsement of this tactic in 1998). 
231 Equally, Strieff is an incentive for police departments to fail to train adequately their officers on the factual 
predicates of a Terry stop. 
232 Adam Liptack, In Dissents, Sonia Sotomayor Takes On the Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2016, at 
A11, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/us/politics/in-dissents-sonia-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-justice-
system.html. 
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Nevertheless, that jurisprudence is not wholly bounded by a narrow, transactional focus. 
Rather, the Court selectively and asymmetrically accounts for dynamic effects. Consider the 
Streiff Court’s treatment of the exclusionary remedy. The Court’s foundational decisions about 
the scope of that remedy focus on its effects on officers’ incentives. The Court has repeatedly 
stressed that it is willing to allow the costly exclusionary remedy only when its downstream 
incentive effects in relation to police compliance with the Fourth Amendment are substantial.233 
Notionally acknowledging this point, the Streiff Court stated that only “purposeful or flagrant” 
police misconduct can be deterred.234 Why this would be so is not clear. Tort liability for 
negligence, for example, can easily be premised on a deterrence theory. In Streiff itself, the Court 
gave no thought to the possibility that its rule might elicit less care by officers in their use of 
Terry stops—let alone a differential impact in neighborhoods characterized by high rates of 
outstanding or bench warrants.  
Streiff suggests that the Court is willing to think about the dynamic effects of the 
exclusionary rule on incentives when doing so narrows Fourth Amendment remedies, but is not 
willing to entertain a dynamic analysis when doing so would expand those remedies.235 In other 
cases, the Justices have similarly being willing to account for increases in police 
professionalism.236 But judicial decisions on the exclusionary rule systematically ignore potential 
institutional problems of police perjury and abusive conduct. 
There is, in short, little reason to expect that the Court’s current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine will provide a lens for capturing the distinctive wrong of SQF. Indeed to the extent it 
nudges police conduct of urban street policing in one way or another, the Court has abetted the 
core wrong of SQF more than it has ameliorated it. For this reason, it seems wiser to analyze 
SQF in terms of its racial impact—a topic addressed at length below and in Part III. 
B. The Limits of Equal Protection Doctrine  
 The Supreme Court’s decisions on race and the Equal Protection Clause provide no better 
traction on the distinctive wrongs of SQF. To the contrary, thinking about racial equality doctrine 
through the lens of SQF illuminates a gap between the Court’s articulated justifications and its 
current doctrinal forms. To take seriously the normative concerns I have flagged would mean 
treating SQF as a paradigmatic Equal Protection violation.  
 
                                                
233 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (“Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. 
The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246 (2012) (reiterating Leon’s deterrence-based logic); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–
237 (2011) (same). 
234 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
235 In a similar vein, David Sklansky has pointed out that the Court toggles without any principled basis between 
rules and standards in Fourth Amendment case-law in ways that inure to the government’s benefit. David A. 
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 294-
98 (1997). 
236 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another development over the past half-century that deters 
civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police 
discipline.”). 
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 Two core prohibitions are embodied in current Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. 
First, explicit racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, and require government to 
“demonstrate with clarity” that its “‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and 
substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary ... to the accomplishment of its 
purpose.’”237 In the absence of an explicit racial classification,238 a government action motivated 
by a “discriminatory purpose” with an adverse effect on a discrete protected class establishes an 
Equal Protection Clause violation. But the Court’s gloss on discriminatory purpose, promulgated 
in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, is cast in exacting terms. It compels 
litigants to show that a state actor “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”239 In 
contrast, a disparate impact on a racial group alone does nothing to impugn the constitutionality 
of a state action.240 
In the criminal justice context, this doctrinal framework leaves the state with a largely 
free hand. At the Supreme Court, few Equal Protection case have arisen in the criminal justice 
context. Only one recent case has grappled with a racial classification. In Johnson v. California, 
a state prison used a racial classification to sort inmates temporarily before cell assignments 
could be determined.241 The Court rejected the state’s call to derogate from strict scrutiny.242 In 
contrast, the Court declined to grant certiorari in Brown v. City of Oneonta, a case that would 
have required it to consider whether the Second Circuit had correctly held that a race-based 
suspect description was not a “racial classification” subject to strict scrutiny.243  
Under Feeney, there are a handful of cases in which prosecutorial use of preemptory 
challenges is held to be racially motivated, and thus to violate the Equal Protection Clause.244 
But cases involving more systemic challenges to the operation of the criminal justice institutions 
have been wholly absent from the Court’s docket since the 1987 case of McClesky v. Kemp.245 In 
large measure, this is because McCleskey established a near-insurmountable barrier to such 
                                                
237 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 
S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013)). 
238 This is a bit imprecise. “Often, courts do not approach the question whether a statute uses express racial 
classifications on formal grounds at all. Instead, the grounds of decision are normative.” Primus, supra note 38, at 
509. 
239 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted). The same standard applies to both religious and racial 
discrimination. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). 
240 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) (citing Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), for the proposition “that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it 
results in a racially disproportionate impact”). 
241 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502-03 (2005) (describing prison policy).  
242 Id. at 505 (holding that “all racial classifications [imposed by government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing 
court under strict scrutiny” (citation and quotation marked omitted). 
243 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), cert denied 534 U.S. 816 (2001). 
244 Such cases are rare, but not unknown. In the 2015 Supreme Court Term, for example, the Court found that the 
Georgia Supreme Court had made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it declined to find that prosecution use of 
preemptory strikes in a capital case was not animated by a discriminatory purpose. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 
1737, 1747-55 (2016). This is an extremely rare ruling, and is explained by the graphic evidence of naked racial 
reasoning (inadvertently) discovered by the defendant. Id. at 1744. This is not the only instance, though, in which a 
finding of discriminatory purpose in the use of preemptory challenges has led to a conviction being vacated. See, 
e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). 
245 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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challenges.246 In that capital case, the Court declined to infer discriminatory purpose from 
unrebutted statistical evidence that Georgia’s capital punishment treated defendants differently 
based on their race and the race of their victim.247 Among the reasons the Court offered for 
declining to entertain even powerful statistical evidence,248 it worried that “if we accepted 
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we 
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty,” including noncapital 
sentencing.249 This concern about what Justice Brennan acerbically characterized as “a fear of too 
much justice”250 reoccurs in other instances in which criminal justice disparities have been 
challenged.251  
After McCleskey, absent the miraculous happenstance of testimonial or documentary 
evidence of bias—a luck that befell plaintiffs in the challenge to New York’s SQF policy252—the 
courthouse door is effectively shut to discriminatory-purpose challenges in the criminal justice 
context.253 McCleskey, in tandem with the narrow definition of “racial classifications” evinced by 
the Court’s treatment of Johnson and Brown, drastically narrows litigants’ opportunities to 
challenge the role of race in criminal justice institutions. They evince no concern for either the 
                                                
246 McCleskey was quickly pilloried, and has been much criticized since. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. 
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (compiling earlier 
criticisms, and noting that “Professor Bedau does not exaggerate when he compares McCleskey to Plessy and 
Korematsu.”). Even Justice Powell, who proved a fifth vote in the case, expressed regret for that vote. David Von 
Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at A1. It is not without 
interest that another case in which Justice Powell cast the deciding vote, and later expressed regret, has since been 
overruled. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3 (noting 
Powell’s regret at having cast a deciding vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which was overruled in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).  
247 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87. The race-of-the-defendant effect identified in the Baldus study, however, was 
relatively small.  
248 Although McCleskey has been much criticized, it is still worth reiterating here that many of its reasons for 
rejecting statistical evidence are plainly spurious. For example, the Court asserted that an unlawful purpose might 
more safely inferred if there were “fewer entities” and “fewer variables.” Id. at 294-95. But the confidence of 
estimated generated by regression increases with size—it does not decrease. And the more alternative explanations 
for variance exist, the more plausible defenses the state has. Further, the Court stated that “discretion is essential to 
the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion 
has been abused.” Id. at 297. This is hard to understand: In the absence of discretion, there would be no opportunity 
for a state actor to take a decision motivated by a discriminatory purpose. To insulate discretionary decisions from 
review for such invalid purposes is to say in effect that there is no discriminatory-purpose liability in the criminal 
law.  
249 Id. at 315 & n.38. 
250 Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner's evidence as 
sufficient is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey's claim would open the door to widespread 
challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing…. [S]uch a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”). 
251 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 376 (1996) (noting “the potentially radical implications” of inferences 
from statistical evidence of racial disparities in the criminal-justice context). 
252 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting the highest ranking uniformed 
officer of the New York Police Department as mandating stops of “young black and Hispanic youths 14 to 20”). 
253 The Court has also limited discovery respecting evidence of racial bias in the prosecutorial context to instances in 
which a defendant can already point to clear evidence of bias. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459, 470 
(1996). Armstrong’s somewhat circular standard has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Race 
and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) 
(contending that standard established by the Court in Armstrong is nearly impossible for many defendants with 
meritorious claims to satisfy). 
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ecological spillovers of enforcement actions onto larger racial cohorts. And much like the Fourth 
Amendment cases canvassed above, they are heedless of dynamic effects—except perhaps 
maintaining a concern for maintaining the criminal-justice status quo. Finally, neither the rule 
against racial classification nor the bar to discriminatory motivations takes into account the 
possibility that officials are aware that a policy pursued for nonracial ends has a wholly 
foreseeable spillover effects on other members of a racial or ethnic cohort,254 or the possibility 
that race is so pervasively correlated with nonracial traits—such as residence, socioeconomic 
status, and the like—that official decision-makers simply cannot disentangle racial from 
nonracial criteria.255  
 
But there is something of a puzzle here. In glossing the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court has invoked ideas of racial stigma,256 racial balkanization,257 and the dignitary interest in 
being judged on one’s own merits.258 It is not hard to see that SQF, as described in Part I, 
implicates each of these concerns. It is, most importantly, expressly predicated on an inference 
from race to criminality.259 It is indeed explicitly defended on a generalization—a stereotype 
about racial minorities that is not merely derogatory, but that has historically been a keystone of 
discriminatory legal architectures. And its advocates make no bones that the price of public 
safety will be borne disproportionately by only some, and only because of the color of their skin. 
Further, it thrives upon the festering racial segregation that scars our cities. Worse, it reinforces 
that segregation to the extent that minorities are subject to increased stops when they leave their 
neighborhoods. Quite literally, it echoes and embeds the balkanization of our cities into black 
and white quarters. And thanks to the weak evidentiary threshold of Terry, it enables police to 
engage in aggregate deprivations of individual liberty that are predicated only fractionally on 
individual behavior and largely on race and place. If one takes the Court’s justifications on face 
value, policing tactics such as SQF, in short, ought to be the sine qua non of what the Equal 
Protection Clause protects.  
Equal Protection doctrine, in conclusion, provides the moral justifications but not the 
doctrinal tools for dealing with SQF. It is beholden to the default narrow and atomistic 
transactional frame of constitutional law, which shears away both ecological and dynamic 
contexts. And ultimately, it lacks the courage of its putative convictions. For these reasons, it is 
not an instrument fit for the task of fixing SQF.  
 
                                                
254 See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 40, at 47 (drawing parallel between Feeney and the doctrine of double 
effect). 
255 Strauss, supra note 204, at 114-15 (discussing the cognitive consequences of such pervasive correlations). 
256 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Classifications based on race carry a 
danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of 
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”). 
257 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (expressing 
concern that the use of racial classifications will exacerbate “race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation 
divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict” (citation omitted). 
258 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden 
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her 
own merit and essential qualities.”). 
259 See supra sources cited in note 79 (quoting, inter alia, New York Police Commission Ray Kelly to the effect that 
it makes sense to stop minorities because minorities tend to commit crime).  
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III. The Disparate Impact Lens on SQF 
 This Part turns from critique to a more constructive proposal. Not all instruments to 
mitigate moral wrongs have to reside in the Constitution. So I look elsewhere. I argue that a 
disparate impact framework of liability, now found in federal statutes and state law, provides a 
better—but not a perfect—framework for analyzing urban street-policing policy. The purpose of 
the disparate impact lens advanced here is diagnostic and distinctly second-best: It is second best 
in the sense that it does not track the loose cost-benefit analysis that is fleshed out in Part I: That 
cost-benefit analysis, in my view, impugns all programmatic use of SQF in racially diverse cities 
at present. More modestly, a disparate impact lens provides a way to identify a class of instances 
in which a police department’s programmatic use of Terry stops is especially likely to be 
unjustified because characterized by its distinctive ecological and dynamic harms. A disparate 
impact lens, that is, flush out instance in which those harms are at an acme.  
 
 Formally, a disparate impact framework identifies a set of cases in which the likely 
proximate costs of SQF are concentrated on minority communities without an adequately 
supported justification. The analysis developed in Part II suggested that the proximate costs of 
SQF—which include the hassle and humiliation of stops—are only a fraction of the total costs of 
SQF. The latter comprise the larger set of dynamic costs to individuals, families and 
communities. If the proximate costs of SQF are highly concentrated, it is likely that aggregate 
costs are also extremely concentrated. Where the state cannot identify a strong public policy 
justification for that concentration, SQF should be ranked as legally problematic. More 
specifically, where the state cannot adequately make the case that the concentration of SQF 
responds to a real crime problem, and in fact mitigates that problem, it should be required to 
reconsider its policing strategy.  In this sense, the avoidance of disparate impact is a modest, 
second-best demand, which directs attention at the right elements of policing strategy.260 It 
invites remedial attention to systemic rather than individualistic pathologies. And it avoids the 
moralizing, and potentially polarizing, language of individual blame and liability.  
  
To flesh out this alternative lens onto SQF, this Part defines and defends disparate impact 
liability as a legally available approach for analyzing policing decisions. In particular, I develop 
the reasons for which disparate impact is superior to the currently dominant constitutional 
approaches described in Part II. Having dealt with potential objections to its translation to the 
policing context, I conclude by sketching how in practice disparate impact liability can be 
applied to SQF. In practice, a disparate impact analysis requires econometric studies of the 
aggregate data about stops, frisks, and other outcomes. I set forth three general lines of inquiry 
that should be applied to such aggregate data to determine whether a disparate impact exists. 
Together, these empirical strategies provide a template for making disparate impact an effective 
and practicable instrument of legal reform.  
 
A. The Availability of Disparate Impact  
The theory of disparate impact liability in race discrimination cases is associated with the 
Supreme Court’s construction of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke 
                                                
260 As such it might be applied more generally to policing tactics, including hot spot policing. 
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Power Company. 261  In a somewhat narrowed form, it remains available to plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases.262 Disparate impact is also a cognizable theory of liability 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act263 and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).264 It can 
be understood as either an instrument for rooting out bad intent, or as a freestanding ground of 
liability.265 Disparate impact is in contrast a ‘road not taken’ in Equal Protection law.266  
 
Disparate impact in the policing context is available under two sets of laws. First, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination under any program or activity” 
receiving federal funds.267 Pursuant to an explicit grant of rule-making authority under the 
statute, federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, have promulgated regulations 
prohibiting disparate racial impacts as well as disparate racial treatment. 268  The Justice 
Department’s disparate-impact regulation applies to “any program for which Federal financial 
assistance is authorized under a law administered by the Department.”269 Because local police 
departments receive federal funding from “dozens” of separate programs, many administered by 
the Department of Justice,270 the Title VI bar on disparate impact applies to most police forces. 
That prohibition, however, may be enforced by public suits but not via private right of action.271 
The New Orleans consent decree and the Baltimore settlement obtained by the Justice 
Department, for example, both invoke Title VI authority, albeit in nebulous terms.272 
Second, at least two states prohibit policing measures with disparate racial impacts. The 
Illinois Civil Rights Act, tracking Title VI’s language and effect, prohibits “discrimination under 
any program or activity on the grounds of that person’s race, color, national origin, or gender.”273 
In at least one case, it has been applied to policing decisions.274 California’s law, which applies to 
all state programs, prohibits “criteria or methods of administration that … have the purpose or 
                                                
261 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
262 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009) (requiring “a strong basis in evidence” to shield employer 
actions “to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision: from disparate treatment liability under Title VII). 
263 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)). 
264 Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) 
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & 3605(a) to permit disparate impact liability). 
265 Primus, supra note 38, at 520-24 (exploring both accounts).  
266 See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131-35 (1997) (describing rejection of disparate impact). 
267 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
268 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013) (Department of Justice); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2012) (Department of 
Transportation); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 
(Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120, 100.130, 100.500). 
269 28 C.F.R. § 42.103 
270 Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 872 (2015) 
271 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Prior to Sandoval, private plaintiffs challenged racially disparate 
policing using Title VI in Maryland State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. MD Dep’t of State, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. 
Md. 1999). 
272 New Orleans Decree, supra note 19, at 2; Baltimore Agreement, supra note 22, at 1. 
273 740 ILCS 23/5 (West 2012); See Jackson v. Cerpa, 696 F. Supp. 2d 962, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[ICRA] was 
expressly intended to provide a state law remedy that was identical to the federal disparate impact canon.”); accord 
McFadden v. Bd. of Educ. for Illinois Sch. Dist. U-46, 984 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
274 For an example of a civil suit based on this provision, see Central Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of 
Chicago, 2013 Il App. (1st) 123041, ¶ 23 (Nov. 13, 2013) (refusing to dismiss suit on political question grounds). 
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effect of subjecting a person to discrimination on the basis of ethnic group identification, 
religion, age, sex, color, or a physical or mental disability.”275  
Disparate impact is commonly framed as a three-step analysis. In the employment-
discrimination context, a prima facie case is established by showing that a specific employer 
practice caused racial disparities in a salient outcome measure.276 A racial disparity is measured 
by comparing employment rates in an employer’s workforce with the qualified labor pool277 or 
the applicant pool,278 rather than to the general population. Agencies interpreting Title VII have 
long used a four-fifth rule to single out cognizable disparities.279 The Court has approving cited 
this interpretation, adding that a simple “significant statistical disparity, and nothing more” is 
needed at the threshold.280 This prima facie case, however, may be rebutted by evidence that “the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.”281 This defense, however, is overcome if there is a legitimate alternative employment 
practice that will result in less discrimination.282  
B. The Comparative Advantage of Disparate Impact  
Black-letter constitutional law largely ignores the ecological and dynamic aspects of 
SQF. It therefore fails to provide a useful analytic lens for determining when and how urban 
street policing goes off the rails. Why would a disparate impact lens do any better? It is not a 
form of cost-benefit analysis of the kind developed above, after all. Rather, disparate impact 
isolates the proximate costs of a policy (excluding, that is, its social, familial, and 
intergenerational effects) and compares to the affirmative policy justifications. In the policing 
context, disparate impact thus weighs a subcategory of the costs imposed on minority 
populations against almost all the crime-control related benefits of the policy. Given its failure to 
capture the full range of costs adumbrated in Part II, and given that it will likely account for most 
of the benefits of SQF, a disparate impact lens is likely to be radically underinclusive: It will 
only capture a subset of cases in which SQF imposes a moral wrong.   
                                                
275 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, § 98101(i)(1). Subsection c of the same provision also makes it unlawful to “provide a 
person with an aid, benefit or service that is not as effective in affording an equal opportunity to obtain the same 
result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others. In some 
situations, identical treatment may be discriminatory.” 
276 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (requiring the identification of “a particular employment practice . . . causes a 
disparate impact”). The causation element reflects the Court’s ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, which 
has been abandoned in other respects. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under 
attack.”). 
277 See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 1994) (“In a case of discrimination in hiring or promoting, the 
relevant comparison is between the percentage of minority employees and the percentage of potential minority 
applicants in the qualified labor pool.”); accord Lopez v. Laborers Int'l Union Local No. 18, 987 F.2d 1210, 1216 
(5th Cir. 1993); Shidaker v. Tisch, 833 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1986).  
278 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (U.S. 1975) (requiring that plaintiffs “show[ ] that 
the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the 
pool of applicants”) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (U.S. 1973)); Connecticut v. 
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (U.S. 1982) (comparing racial composition of those entering the selection process with that 
of people ultimately promoted). 
279 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1978).  
280 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
281 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1).  
282 Id.  
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Nevertheless, there are three reasons for thinking that disparate impact is a better fit for 
identifying the distinctive moral wrong of SQF identified in Part I. First, disparate impact 
liability is at least focused on aggregate, rather than individual, outcomes. It is panoramic rather 
than microscopic. The institutional focus of disparate impact widens the array of relevant 
institutional decisions that can be considered as causes of harm. Policing is not simply a matter 
of officers on the street, making ad hoc decisions. Like any other complex organizations, a police 
force is channeled through policies, practices, and bureaucratic norms developed at competing 
institutional nodes, from city hall to chief of police’s office to the precinct-house. The capacious 
lens used by disparate impact captures more relevant state actions than an approach focused on 
bad motives. 
 
Analysis under a wide-angle disparate impact rubric is also not limited to the 
consequences of a discrete individual’s action. It focuses more capaciously on all “the effects of 
[a] … practice.”283 SQF, as I have described it in Part I, need not rest on pernicious individual 
motivations to do a distinctive moral wrong. Rather, that wrong flows from the “effects” of 
institutional policies and practices. Disparate impact is sensitive to a wide range of effects, and is 
in particular able to capture the interaction between past distributions and present policing 
practice. An institutional practice, such as SQF, will produce different effects depending on the 
context to which is applied. When employed in a fashion that tracks patterns of existing racial 
segregation, its race-related patterns will be different from an application that cuts across extant 
forms of racial stratification. This difference is captured in the broad scope of disparate impact 
analysis, which accounts for history, as well as institutional context, in a way that discriminatory 
treatment analysis cannot. 
Second, disparate impact analysis focuses attention on the morally relevant question of 
whether the crime-control benefits of the policy as a whole justify its costs. Once a racial effect 
is identified at the threshold step, the second step of the disparate-impact analysis involves a 
consideration of the affirmative justifications for the disparity. In effect, the analysis weighs 
positives against negatives. In the discriminatory treatment context, by contrast, there is no 
opportunity to identify or weigh these costs. As a result, when a race-based criteria is used, as in 
Brown v. City of Oneonta,284 a Court inclined to permit race-based suspect descriptions as cost-
justified will find it easier to avoid strict scrutiny by declining to perceive a racial classification 
at work in the first instance.285 On the other side of the ledger, disparate-impact analysis also 
considers the aggregate outcomes of a policy. In the SQF context, for example, this would mean 
counts of the numbers of different racial groups who are stopped. Again, it is important to 
emphasize that this is not a full tally of the ecological and dynamic spillovers from aggressive 
SQF policing. But it accounts for of the policy’s sheer size—and hence reflects (very 
approximately) the effect of a large number of minority stops on self-worth, residential patterns, 
and stereotypical assumptions about the links between race and crime far better than a legal 
framework pinched to fit cleanly around individual motives.  
                                                
283 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) (second emphasis supplied). 
284 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), cert denied 534 U.S. 816 (2001). 
285 Indeed, the Brown Court’s argument that no racial classification was at work because the suspect description also 
mentioned gender, as Richard Primus explains, simply “cannot be right,” because it implies that “what would be a 
racial classification standing alone is not a racial classification if the racial criterion is combined with nonracial 
criteria.” Primus, supra note 38, at 512.  
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Finally, disparate impact liability obviates the need to make controversial judgments 
about individuals’ intentions, beliefs, and attitudes. By focusing attention on these elusive 
psychological facts, both Terry and Feeney invite self-deception and perjury. The Feeney 
framework in particular also ratchets up emotional stakes by predicating a remedy on the finding 
that a specific person is motivated by discriminatory intent, a standard that has the potential to 
induce backlash.286 By training upon consequentialist criteria instead, the disparate impact 
standard obviates loaded, and easily deflected, allegations of bad intent, even as it draws salutary 
attention to the deeper and more enduring costs of SQF.  
To be clear, no judicially enforceable theory of liability will provide a panacea to the 
problem of concentrated racialized poverty, or the complex network of state action and inaction 
that created and perpetuated it. The case for disparate impact liability in the policing context rests 
on the more modest claim that it captures a wider array of morally relevant costs and benefits 
than the available alternatives. It does not imply perfection. 
C. The Objections to Disparate Impact in the Policing Context 
Three objections to the application of disparate impact liability to the policing context are 
worth resolving before turning to the nitty-gritty of application. They concern its 
constitutionality, its efficacy, and the availability of popular support.  
To begin with, there has recently been a question about the constitutionality of disparate 
impact liability, even though in its infancy in the 1970s it was understood as an important strand 
of Equal Protection law.287 Paradoxically, at least one member of the Court has intimated that 
disparate impact might itself violate the Equal Protection Clause because it forces race 
consciousness.288 Nevertheless, more recent precedent suggests that there is “no constitutional 
problem in the existence of disparate impact prohibitions,” but that “those prohibitions might 
raise such problems in their application.”289 In particular, the Court has suggested that the second 
step of the analysis—the proffer of legitimate justifications for a disparity—is key.  
In glossing the FHA’s disparate impact prong, the Court in its 2015 Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project opinion cautioned that 
constitutional problems would arise if “liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a 
statistical disparity.”290 Rather, it is only “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that 
                                                
286 External control efforts, such as individual blame and liability, tend to increase certain forms of racial bias. See 
Lisa Legault, Jennifer N. Gutsell, & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic effects of antiprejudice messages how motivational 
interventions can reduce (but also increase) prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472, 1472-75 (2011). 
287 Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 40, at 11-13 (noting that in the 1970s, “equal protection law did not sharply 
distinguish proof of purpose and proof of impact”). 
288 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Title VII's disparate-impact provisions 
place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to 
make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court 
explains, discriminatory.”). 
289 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law 
After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1129 (2016). 
290 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
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legitimately and constitutionally trigger such liability. 291  This places great stress on the 
opportunity for a defendant in a disparate impact proceeding to point to “[non-]arbitrary” and 
“[]necessary” grounds for a justification.292 More specifically, a regression analysis used to 
identify a race effect must include controls for legitimate justifications for a disparity.293  
 
A second concern raised by a number of recent commentators is that “the disparate 
impact theory has produced no substantial social change and there is no reason to think that 
extending the theory to other contexts would have produced meaningful reform.”294 A common 
thread uniting these concerns is the premise that courts are unwilling to “broadly restructure 
social institutions”295 or interfere with the private intra-firm ordering.296  
 
To be sure, the frailty of the judicial will to enforce constitutional norms on behalf of 
disfavored groups can almost never be overstated. Nevertheless, blanket pessimism is excessive 
for two reasons. To begin with, several cities are already operating under consent decrees or 
settlements that either include a monitor or envisage much judicially supervised reorganization 
of street policing.297 Further, there is no reason to think that municipal officials involved in the 
negotiation and operationalizing of these deals lack any interest in mitigating the fierce public 
pressure to diminish the racial tensions of urban policing. The application of disparate impact 
liability provides a more cogent way for them to understand how to do so than available 
alternatives. In addition, precise agency regulations, such as those issued in 2015 under the FHA, 
have the potential “to stabilize disparate impact law and to provide clarity to regulated entities 
subject to different judicial standards.”298 There is no reason such stabilization cannot be 
achieved in the policing context through more specific Justice Department regulations. Indeed, 
the more granular account of how to think about disparate impact in the context of policing data 
that follows in Part III.C itself can be read as providing a framework for such regulations.  
 
                                                
291 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).  
292 An alternative formulation of this concern is that disparate impact not “operate to encourage regulated entities to 
classify individuals based on race.” Bagenstos, supra note 289, at 1116. Whereas in the employment context, the 
shadow of disparate impact liability might push employers toward the use of quotas, it is hard to see how disparate 
impact would have this effect in the policing context. To the contrary, in the absence of disparate impact, SQF is 
arguably best understood as motivated by implicit quotas.  
293 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 & n. 10 (U.S. 1986) (requiring controls for “major factors”). Lower 
courts have stressed the need to avoid controls for anything other than a legitimate justification. See, e.g., Anderson 
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 280 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[S]tatistical evidence does not have to 
control for every single variable in order to be sufficient.”).  
294 Selmi, supra note 53, at 705. For similar diagnoses, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits 
of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) [hereinafter “Bagenstos, Structural Turn”] (“Disparate 
impact doctrine has been in a massive decline over the past few decades”); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1204-07 (2000) (similarly bemoaning 
“the decline of disparate impact”). 
295 Olatunde Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396 (2007). 
296 Selmi, supra note 53, at 708 (“Taking seriously the disparate impact theory would have posed a substantial 
challenge to existing practices, which is precisely why the theory never has been taken particularly seriously by 
courts”); see also Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 294, at 45 (making a similar point by noting that courts 
dislike any departure from a “fault-based” theory of discrimination liability).  
297 See supra text accompanying notes 16 to 25. 
298 Olatunde Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 127 (2014). 
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Finally, it might be argued that broad support for aggressive street policing within 
minority communities provides a sufficient justification for racially disparate allocation of Terry 
stops.299 If the very communities that suffer the costs of intensive policing also clamor for such 
policing, the moral case for disparate impact liability seems thin indeed. Yet evidence for 
community demand in the context of SQF is thin on the ground. Protests in Chicago, New York, 
and Philadelphia about stop and protest have been led by organizations from minority 
communities.300 More generally, to the extent that African-American political leaders have 
sought increased policing, there have been “accompanying demands to redirect power and 
economic resources to low-income minority communities.”301 But “[w]hen blacks ask for better 
policing, legislators tend to hear more instead.”302 Disparate impact liability is more sensitive to 
the marginal crime-control costs benefits attached to SQF, as well as its costs. It is therefore a 
sensible way to reconcile minority communities’ demands for both better public security and 
also freedom for excessive street policing cannot.  
 
D. Disparate Impact In Action  
This final section sketches how a disparate impact analysis of SQF data might be put into 
action. Its twofold aim is to show that such inquiries are feasible, and to start to make progress 
on some of the knotty theoretical puzzles raised by disparate impact’s implementation. I focus on 
a threshold question. The settlements in Philadelphia and Chicago, which were both reached 
without information-generating litigation, require collection of extensive data concerning the 
timing, justifications, suspect demographics, and consequences of stops.303 How might this data 
be interrogated for evidence of disparate impact? How concretely, that is, is it possible to inquiry 
into whether a discrete practice or policy causes a racially disparate impact that is not justified on 
legitimate and necessary grounds be executed? In answering these questions, I focus on the 
theoretical questions of what kinds of disparities should count, not more technical questions of 
econometric identification strategy.   
 
A disparate racial impact can result from one of three elements of policing strategy. Each 
warrants separate and distinct analysis. At each level, racial disparities salient to the distinctive 
moral wrong of SQF can emerge. And at each level, the state can also avail itself of different 
legitimate justifications for the disparity. If anything, the feasible analytic tools favor the state. 
Disparate impact, in the fashion developed here, is likely underinclusive insofar as it does not 
capture all the ecological and dynamic externalities from SQF. The availability of plural tests to 
capture a racially disparate effect only partially compensate for this lacuna. Nevertheless, it is the 
                                                
299 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of 
Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 197-98 (celebrating African-American communities’ demand for 
more policing). 
300 Leland & Moynihan, supra note 13, at A15 (noting African-American leadership in protests in New York); 
Leonor Vivanco, 5 young Chicago activists answer 5 questions about the movement, Redeye (Chicago), Feb 8, 
2016, http://www.redeyechicago.com/news/redeye-five-activists-answer-five-questions-20160122-story.html 
(profiling leaders of anti-SQF movement in Chicago).  
301 Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-Haussman, & Vesla Weaver, Did Blacks really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2016, at A25. 
302 Id. (emphasis in original); see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: 
THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134-38, 322-23 (2016) (tracing the “war on black crime” back 
to the Nixon and Reagan Administration’s policies). 
303 Philadelphia Settlement, supra note 18, at ¶ II.B; Chicago Settlement, supra note 17, at ¶ I.1. 
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extant doctrinal framework for the problem, and likely superior to anything that can be created 
from scratch in current political conditions.  
 
For the purpose of illustration here, I hypothesize a municipal jurisdiction that has just 
entered a consent decree. We can assume that like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, this 
municipality is racially and economically segregated, with race and socioeconomic status closely 
covarying. We can also assume that the city is sliced into precincts, which are the foundational 
elements of the geographic allocation of police. The municipality’s SQF, as in real-life cases, is 
directed at neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and high crime—which are also majority 
minority. The municipality is required to gather data about stops of the kind elicited by the 
Chicago and Philadelphia settlements. I will assume police collect that data faithfully.304 I focus 
here on the legal question of what questions can be asked of the resulting data.  
 
I discuss each three levels of analysis in turn. Each time, I identify the relevant element of 
state policy or practice; the outcome across which racial disparities may be observed; and the 
range of feasible justifications a municipality might offer. Where possible, I also note if the 
question has been examined in an existing study or litigation. 
 
1. Between Precinct Disparities 
 
The first level of analysis that should be tested is the rate of SQF deployment by precinct. 
Recall that the core justification for SQF tendered by its defenders is that street police are 
deployed where crime occurs; racial disparities arise only because crime is concentrated in 
minority neighborhoods.305 But this may not be the case. Perceptions of crime can also be a 
function of the racial composition of a neighborhood.306 A threshold policy decision to be tested 
is the volume of Terry stop per precinct with a lagged measure of crime as a control as a way of 
determining whether the geographical distribution of policing resources turns on racial 
demographics or crime rates.307  
 
For example, Jeffrey Fagan tested whether the number of stops per precinct in New York 
City was disproportionate to the racial composition of the precinct, after controlling for several 
different types of historical crime rate, revealed that the crime-based justification for SQF’s 
allocation was unfounded.308 Using an ordinary least squares regression, he found that the 
percentage of African-American residents was a stronger predictor of Terry stop volume than 
lagged rates of violent crime, narcotics offices, weapons offenses and trespass.309 Only property 
                                                
304 This is a rather ambitious assumption. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. & 
POL. 103, 112 (2002) [hereinafter “Fagan, Law, Social Science”] (expressing concerns on this front). 
305 See sources cited in supra note 79. 
306 See sources cited in supra notes 179 and 180. 
307 Cf. Sarath Sanga, Does Officer Race Matter?, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 403, 405 (2014) [hereinafter “Sanga, 
Does Officer Race Matter?”] (finding in a study of Oakland street policing that “where one is stopped may be more 
important than by whom one is stopped”).    
308 Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 33 (table 5). The main regression Fagan presents contains a control for patrol 
strength, while one of the sensitivity test omits that variable. To the extent that this analysis seeks to ascertain 
whether deployments at the precinct level are justified, the inclusion of patrol strength creates a potential included 
variable problem. Stated otherwise, patrol strength is a function of deployment levels, not a justification of the latter.  
309 Id. at 41, n.52 & 43. Fagan also presents a series of charts showing stop rates per crime complaints by minority 
population share. Id. at 25-27. These illustrate the same disparity.  
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and quality-of-life rates outperformed race as predictors of stop volume.310 This is an especially 
striking result given SQF’s justification in the Kansas City Experiment as a means of reducing 
violent crime, and as an alternative to broken windows policing.311  
 
It is also striking because the assumption that an increase in crime rates should predict a 
subsequent increase in street stops is a dubious that stacks the deck in the state’s favor in a 
normative troubling way. More specifically, the use of lagged crime rates as a control assumes 
that the only available, or perhaps the best available, policing response to upticks in crime 
concern is more intensive street policing. But this is false.312 As I have argued, the evidence that 
SQF has a large crime-control effect is weak, especially in comparison to alternative policing 
instruments.313  The use of crime rates as a baseline further assumes that Terry stops are 
responsive to all kinds of violent crime. At least for the proportion of violent crimes that occur 
within the home against partners or other intimates, it is hard to see how Terry stops respond to 
those problems.314 In short, there is no good reason to assume the best, only, or most effective 
response to rising crime rates in a specific neighborhood is to up the number of people being 
stopped.315  
 
A between-precinct measure of racial disparities can be combined with a range of other 
measures to develop a more nuanced understanding of how policing resources are allocated 
across geographic areas. Hence, simple descriptive statistics can provide useful confirmatory 
evidence, even if they are cannot on their own prove disparate-impact liability under Inclusive 
Communities.316 The data might be further interrogated by comparing the determinants of 
precinct-level deployments with the rate of stops per resident, conditional on racial identity.317 
Where such citywide tests find that not only do minority neighborhoods bear a disproportionate 
toll of stops, but minority individuals also bear a larger share of those stops, there is reason for 
concern that SQF is not only regressive in effect, but also triggers the dynamic, vicious-circle 
processes described in Part I.C. In addition, the between-precinct distribution of street policing is 
usefully contrast with the distribution of other policing resources. If precincts that receive 
intensive Terry treatments, for example, are associated with lower rates of other policing 
measures—e.g., they have fewer officers deployed across both reactive and proactive policing, or 
they have persistently longer wait times for 911 calls—then there is further reason for skepticism 
that crime control simplicter in fact elucidates racial disparities across geographic subunits 
within the municipality.  
                                                
310 Id. 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 88 and 70 (describing, respectively, the Kansas City Experiment and Broken 
Windows policing). 
312 See supra text accompanying notes 119 to 127. 
313 See supra Part I.B.2.  
314 Other studies have found that citizen complaints of drug transactions do not predict narcotics-related deployment 
rates. Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug 
Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 126-27 (2006). 
315 For a further set of criticisms, see Fagan, Law, Social Science, supra note 304, at 117-18.  
316 Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) 
(noting that constitutional problems would arise if “liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical 
disparity”). 
317 Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowshy, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angles Police Department 
9-10 (October 2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-Profiling-
Report-ACLU.pdf.  
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2. Within-Precinct Disparities 
 
The next level of analysis focuses on the distribution of Terry stops by racial or ethnic 
group within a precinct. Between-precinct tests are incomplete because even if there are no 
between-precinct disparities, a disparate racial impact might emerge within a given precinct 
because racial minorities engaged in the same (potentially criminal) conduct as non-minorities 
are more likely, holding all else constant, to be stopped or otherwise policed than non-minorities.  
 
The intuition that racial minorities may be overpoliced in comparison to similar non-
minority citizens is easy to see in the context of racially heterogeneous central business districts, 
where minority citizens may be perceived as categorically out of place and hence suspicious. But 
the same disparity can arise even in poorer, majority-minority neighborhoods. A pair of studies 
of narcotics policing in Seattle by Katherine Beckett and her colleagues nicely illustrate how race 
might figure in within-precinct dynamics in this way. Their first study demonstrated (among 
other things) that in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, three percent of those purchasing 
narcotics were African-American, while 20.5 percent of those arrested were African-
American.318 Their second study found that predominantly white outdoor drugs markets received 
“far less attention” from police than racially diverse ones, such that the “geographic 
concentration of law enforcement resources [was] a significant cause of racial disparity.”319 
Indeed, a qualitative component of the study found that police officers flagged one racially 
diverse crack market while failing to mention an “overwhelmingly white” market for 
prescription drugs operating alongside it.320 Beckett and her collaborators explicitly consider the 
possibility that differences in the policing of crack cocaine and prescription drug markets may be 
due to different levels of associated violence. They find, however, that the association between 
crack and violence “does not appear to have existed in Seattle during the period under study.”321 
These Beckett studies’ findings echo sociological findings of how racial composition predict 
perceptions of crime, and historical findings about the deep roots of stereotypes of black 
criminality. They demonstrate the importance of a nuanced and contextualized analysis of what 
is happening within heavily policed neighborhoods, rather than a blasé assumption that heavy 
policing in high-crime neighborhoods is necessarily even-handed or efficacious. 
 
A within-precinct analysis usefully considers whether the rate of minority stops is better 
predicted by legitimate policing grounds or suspects’ race, conditional on certain precinct level 
characteristics. Within a pool of stop-related data, the number of stops per ethnic group within a 
given time period would be the outcome variable (i.e., dependent variable) to be explained.322 
For a given precinct, one could ask whether there is a statistically significant correlation between 
the rate of stops and the fact individual suspects are African-American or Hispanic rather than 
white, controlling for certain precinct-level characteristics. Some existing studies deploy a 
method called multilevel modeling to control simultaneously for individual and precinct-level 
                                                
318 Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 
SOC. PROB. 419, 435 (2005). 
319 Beckett, Nyrop & Pfingst, supra note 314, at 129.  
320 Id. at 130. 
321 Beckett et al, supra note 318, at 433. 
322 See, e.g., Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 40-42 & tbl. 6 (reporting the results of a multilevel Poisson regression 
on stops by suspected crime controlling for precinct characteristics and lagged crime conditions). 
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factors.323 I will assume that approach is valid, although nothing rests on that assumption so long 
as some other econometric technique is available.  
 
The pivotal question for such multilevel models is the choice of control variables to 
capture “[non-]arbitrary” and “[]necessary” justifications.324 A disparate impact model should 
include only control variables that provide normatively valid justifications for a within-precinct 
racial disparity. In this regard, it is fundamentally dissimilar from tests for discriminatory 
motives. A regression-based test for the latter operates by excluding all possible explanations for 
a stop except for the race of a suspect. The study employed in the New York litigation, for 
example, controls for the foreign-born proportion of a precinct; socioeconomic status, and the 
presence of a business district.325 But a racial disparate impact, as a matter of law, arises not only 
when there is no other possible explanation for a racial gap in stop rates. It also arises when there 
is no legitimate explanation related to policing goals for that gap. In this regard, the economic 
analysis of disparate impacts is unlike the large array of econometric studies that focus on a 
“causal if-then question” and treat randomized trials as an “ideal.”326 Variables such as the 
socioeconomic character of a precinct, its foreign-born populace, and officer race have no place 
in disparate-impact analysis.327 Their inclusion leads to “included variable bias” insofar as they 
“would not plausibly justify a racial disparity in outcomes.”328 Even when included in disparate 
treatment analyses, they result in “bloated statistical models so chock-full of covariates (i.e., 
control variables) that any evidence of disparate treatment disappears.”329 
 
In several existing studies, lagged crime rates are used as the baseline control in this sort 
of multilevel model.330 This parameter at least relates directly to the best justification that a 
municipality has for increased street stops—i.e., crime-related patterns—subject to the concerns 
raised above.331 It captures the ways in which deployment levels might fluctuate in respond to 
shifts in the geographic distribution of crime. It is also superior to a benchmark of lagged arrest 
rates, which is employed in some models.332 The latter are potentially influenced by officers’ 
racial beliefs. Hence, a recent metastudy of effect of suspect race on arrest decisions found that 
                                                
323 Multilevel modeling describes a school of approaches for including both micro- and macro-level factors in the 
same equation to explain a single dependent variable. Thomas A. DiPrete & Jerry D. Forristal, Multilevel Models: 
Method and Substance, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 332-33 (1994).  
324 See supra text accompanying notes 291 to 292. 
325 Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 42, tbl. 7; Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 37-38, tbl. 7. 
326 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S 
COMPANION 11-12 (2009). For this reason, the propensity score matching models used in some policing studies are 
not suitable for disparate impact analysis. See Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 97-100 (noting and criticizing the use 
of such models elsewhere). 
327 The racial composition of a precinct is a relevant control if it proxies for the expected composition of persons on 
the street—as assumption that will not hold in downtowns or transit hubs.  
328 Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 13; see also Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of 
“Included Variable Bias” 3-4 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/ayresincludedvariablebias.pdf. 
329 Oakland report, supra note 25, at 6. 
330 See Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 42; Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 34. Possible variant on these 
report’s approaches is lagged rates of gun crime, which bear on the violent-crime related justification at times 
offered for SQF. 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 312 to 314. 
332 See Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 47, at 817-18. 
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minorities are at least 30 percent more likely to be arrested as similar nonminority suspects.333 
Historical arrest rates thus provide a distorted baseline, which obscures potential racial 
disparities in stops by implicitly controlling for officer bias.  
  
It is worth underscoring once more that the racial composition of the pool of those 
suspected of a crime, or arrested for a crime is by no means an unproblematic benchmark for the 
racial composition of those subject to a Terry stop even within a particular neighborhood. The 
best argument from using such data as a benchmark, in my view, focuses solely on racial 
composition of the local violent offender population. It hypothesizes that police focus either on 
people or places associated with higher violent crime risk. Given racial segregation and racial 
divides between social groups, it is then predicted that the racial composition of the stopped 
population will track that of the at-risk population. 
 
Setting aside questions about the efficacy of SQF generally as a crime-control measure, 
there are nonetheless three reasons for skepticism of this logic. First, this logic assumes that 
municipalities can accurately zero in on not just places but persons who present a risk of 
violence. It is not clear that this is so. A recent study of Chicago’s Strategic Subjects List, for 
example, found that individuals on the city’s list were no more or less likely to be victimized by 
violence than a control group.334  
 
Second, if SQF focuses on places rather than persons, the number of individuals involved 
in violent crime is generally a tiny fraction of the volume of people stopped. 335 In the 
exceptionally bloody month of August 2016 in Chicago, for example, 90 people were killed by 
gunfire.336 The number of stops that month was likely at least two orders of magnitude greater. 
Even assuming that the Chicago police in that month were focused accurately on corners where 
violence was likely to occur, more than 100 instances of reasonable articulable suspicion were 
being targeted for every one act of violence. Even if police then have reason to anticipate a 
particular corner or street will witness violence, at a minimum some 99 out of every 100 stops 
will have no relation to that violence. Historical patterns of violence cannot explain why 
reasonable articulable suspicion existed for those individuals. The racial demographics of violent 
crimes or violent crime-related arrests on a given street or corner do not in any meaningful sense 
predict the racial distribution of reasonable articulable suspicion that police can witness at any 
given moment in time. For most stops, most of the time, therefore, historical crime rates are 
irrelevant to the incidence of a Terry stop. 
 
Finally, imagine a municipality that affirmatively directs its police to engage in a pattern 
of stops that mimics the racial distribution of violent crime offenders. In many contexts, that 
                                                
333 Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David D. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest 
Decisions, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011).  
334 Jessica Saunders, Priscillia Hunt, & John S. Hollywood, Predictions put into practice: a quasi-experimental 
evaluation of Chicago’s predictive policing pilot, -- J. EXP. CRIM. – (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).  
335 For evidence of the very small number of those involved in gun violence, see Andrew V. Papachristos, 
Christopher Wildeman, and Elizabeth Roberto, Tragic, but not random: The social contagion of nonfatal gunshot 
injuries, 30 SOC. SCI & MEDICINE 1, 1 (2014) (finding nonfatal gun injuries confined to “less than 6 percent” of 
Chicago’s population). 
336 Jeremy Gorner, After 90 killed in August, Chicago may soon pass last year's homicide toll, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept 
1, 2016) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-homicides-august-20160901-story.html 
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distribution will skew heavily towards African-Americans (and to a lesser extent Latinos). This 
is, in effect a system of racial quotas where some 99 out of 100 of those subject to state coercion 
suffer that fate based solely on their race rather than their own past conduct. Especially given the 
weak empirical support for SQF’s efficacy, such a policy raises stark Equal Protection concerns 
even under the Supreme Court’s current highly restrictive view of the doctrine.337   
 
Instead of using crime rates, violent crime rates, or analogous arrest rates as a benchmark 
of just policing, therefore, a study of disparate impact would ideally track Beckett and 
colleagues’ Seattle study in estimating the racial composition of the baseline population subject 
to police action through ethnographic observation (of open-air drug markets) and other means.338 
Ideally, that is, data would be sampled, perhaps from police body-cameras, to estimate the racial 
composition of the population observed on patrol for whom reasonable articulable suspicion 
obtained. If, like police in Beckett’s studies, officers tended to ignore non-minority offenders 
while stopping minority offenders, a within-precinct disparity would be established with 
certainty. Such an approach is hardly impossible. Indeed, a recent study of Oakland policing 
used text analysis of sound recordings from officers’ body-cameras to identify differential racial 
treatment.339  
 
3. Within- and Between Officer Disparities  
 
 Finally, disparities can emerge not only at the aggregate levels of between- and within-
precincts. 340  They can also arise either because some (or all) officers within a precinct 
differentiate between minority and nonminority suspects without a legitimate justification. This 
level of police action—which comprises the dispersed exercise of individual officers’ 
discretion—demands attention to the sequence of distinct police actions embedded within a 
particular interaction, ranging from the decision to stop, the decision to frisk, the use of force, 
and the imposition of subsequent consequences such as citations or arrests. Given the existence 
of outstanding warrants as a reason for arrests, however, the latter are a particularly tricky 
variable to analyze because they may be unrelated to the initial stop. I sketch here the most 
promising approaches for identifying racial disparities at the individual offer level. I then caution 
against the use of the most popular economic model of police stops, commonly known as the 
KPT model, as neither apposite nor realistic as a framework for analyzing SQF.  
 
 Individual officers might create racially disparate effects in two ways. First, the Terry 
standard of reasonable articulable suspicion is a vague term with a range of possible 
calibrations.341 Some or all officers might apply stronger or weaker evidentiary predicates for 
stops of different racial groups. Second, as Fryer’s powerful analysis of New York policing 
demonstrates, officers might differentially treat minorities who have been stopped by employing 
a greater quantum of violence. Other outcomes, such as citations and arrests, might also be 
disparately allocated. Disparities in both stop rates and post-stop outcomes should be analyzed in 
a disparate-impact analysis. 
                                                
337 See supra text accompanying notes 237 to 240. 
338 Beckett, Nyrop & Pfingst, supra note 314, at 116-18; Beckett et al, supra note 318, at 422-23.  
339 Oakland report, supra note 25, at 15-19. 
340 See, e.g., id. at 11-12 (describing between-officer disparities). 
341 See supra text accompanying notes 206 to 209.  
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On the stop-rate question, a simple measure is to rerun the multilevel models used for 
within-precinct disparities using officers rather than precincts as the relevant unit of analysis and 
lagged crime rates (measured at the smallest available geographic unit) as a control.342 A parallel 
analysis can be run for outcomes, such as the seizure of contraband or firearms.343 Again, 
included variable bias would result if controls other than legitimate policing justification (such as 
the lagged-crime-rate measure) were included.  
 
Alternatively, a more novel approach involves the use of the “stop-level hit rate” 
(“SHR”) or the ex ante probability of discovering contraband or a weapon based on what an 
officer knows before a stop.344 Focusing on weapons-related stops, Goel and colleagues first use 
two years’ worth of historical stop forms to calculate the actual probability of finding a weapon 
for various combinations of factors listed on stop forms as the basis of ‘reasonable articulable 
suspicion’ (along with location, timing, and local hit-rate data).345 This enables them to calculate 
the distribution of ex ante probabilities of finding weapons for minorities and nonminorities, both 
in general and holding location constant.346 In effect, by comparing the distribution of SHRs for 
blacks and whites, they show that the effective quantum of reasonable articulable suspicion for 
minorities is lower than that used for nonminorities.347 The same analysis might be executed by 
precinct or by officer to determine if racial disparities are either geographically concentrated or 
the work of a small fraction of officers.  
 
 Finally, the economics literature is dominated by a model by John Knowles, Nicola 
Persico and Petra Todd known as the KPT model.348 In capsule form, KPT is a game-theoretical 
model of traffic stops in which police seek to maximize arrests and both black and white 
motorists maximize contraband. Police observe race. Both they and motorists strategically 
anticipate the other’s actions. KPT predicts a Nash equilibrium in which blacks and whites are 
stopped at different rates, while the probability of finding contrabands (i.e., the hit rate) across 
groups is equal. The force of the model is to show how what at first seems a racial disparity—
unequal stop rates—is in fact explained by dynamic strategic action by both police and 
motorists. 349  As a correlative, differences in hit rates provide evidence of taste-based 
discrimination. 
 
  For several reasons, the KPT model is not well-suited to identify the core wrong of 
racially disparate policing. To begin with, KPT is “informative only about bias in searches, not in 
stops.”350 It is also a model for detecting taste-based discrimination, or animus, rather than the 
use of race as an accurate generalization or the disparate racial impact of another factor (e.g., 
                                                
342 Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 22; Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 65-69.  
343 Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 69-71. 
344 Goel et al., supra note 48, at 6. 
345 Goel, Rao & Shiroff, supra note 48, at 371-73. 
346 Goel et al., supra note 48, at 30-31. 
347 Id. at 6 (“49% of the stops for blacks fell below the 1 % probability threshold … but only 1 % for whites.”). 
348 Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 30, at 205-07; see also Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, The Hit Rate Test for 
Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches, 25 JUST. Q. 37, 39-42 (2008). 
349 Persico & Todd, supra note 348, at 42 (“If … hit rates are equalized [across groups] then disparities in search 
frequencies, while possible, are not evidence of police bias.”). 
350 Id.  
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socioeconomic status).351 Stated otherwise, it ignores all negative externalities from race-based 
policing.352 Even in this more limited compass, its core equilibrium concept rests on the 
questionable assumption that police and motorists’ know of, and dynamically adapt to, each 
other’s behavior.353 Extensions of their work that vary the models show that equal hit rates might 
also be consistent with racial animus.354 Because the modeling assumptions of KPT are so 
controversial, and its implications so fragile, it does not provide a useful lens even for the limited 
question of whether there is animus-based searches.  
 
* * * 
 
 This Part has aimed to demonstrate that a disparate-impact lens on SQF is constitutional, 
legally available, and practicable. To that end, it has both articulated its legal basis and sketched 
its practical operation. That kernel of analytic methods, I hope, can provide a catalyst for more 
ambitious and innovation exploration of the ecological and dynamic manifestations of racial 
disparities from SQF that, to date, remain in the empirical shadows.  
 
Conclusion 
Aggressive deployment of Terry stops has been a point of friction between urban police 
and impoverished minority communities for more than fifty years. We are in a moment at which 
a measure of reform appears politically feasible—or so the recent spate of settlements and 
consent decrees might suggest. 355  Without a clear account of why and when aggressive 
deployment of Terry stops can be a moral wrong, we will not have a clear sense of when or how 
we might deploy law to remedy it.  
 
This Article has aimed to specify the distinctive moral wrong of SQF and to demonstrate 
that the law does have resources to identify it. My central claim has been that a disparate impact 
lens, applicable to police pursuant to Title VI and state law, provides a better vantage point than 
                                                
351 Engel, supra note 58, at 3. 
352 Durlauf, supra note 141, at F407. 
353 For example, the KPT model assumes that “in the absence of preferential discrimination, everyone carries 
contraband,” which is “not true.” Sanga, Does Officer Race Matter, supra note 307, at 407. Moreover, “the quest to 
empirically decompose motives into distinctly moral and economic categories can prove quixotic.” Id. at 409. For an 
extensive critique of this and other assumptions of the KPT model, see Robin S. Engel & Ron Tillyer, Searching for 
Equilibrium: The Tenuous Nature of the Outcome Test, 25 JUST. Q. 54, 65-66 (2008).  
Persico and Todd cite the fact that equal hit rates are observed as evidence that their assumptions are 
correct. Persico & Todd, supra note 348, at 45. In their original paper, hit rates for Hispanic did not equal rates for 
whites. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 30, at 222; accord Ruben Hernández-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial 
Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959, 972 (2004) (same result in 
a Missouri sample). A subsequent analysis by Sanga of a greater sample of the same data from Maryland used by 
KPT found lower hit rates for both blacks and Hispanics. Sarath Sanda. Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle 
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1158 (2009). Applying KPT’s own verification criterion, 
therefore, the theory fails.  
354 See, e.g., Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternate Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: 
Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 130-32 (2006) (accounting for officers’ race); Dhammika 
Dharmapala & Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence, 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 14 (2004) (accounting for offense severity and vehicle ownership). 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 16 to 25. 
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black-letter constitutional law. By demonstrating that a disparate impact lens is constitutional, 
potent, and practicable in terms of its implementation, I hope to begin a new conversation about 
the role that law and courts can play in resolving the aching sore that is minority-police relations 
in America’s cities today.  
 
What I have offered here, though, is emphatically only the beginning of that story: The 
law, I have shown, can be used to identify instances in which street policing plays a role in 
perpetuating and deepening racial and social stratification. Once identified, dysfunctional 
policing must be remedied through political pressure and legal injunctions that will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There is no universal panacea. Police reform, moreover, is only one 
element of a larger necessary program of social reform necessary to dislodge the persistence of 
racialized concentrated poverty. Police do not create ghettos, and getting policing right will not 
dissolve ghettos overnight. Nevertheless, doing so is a necessary component of rectifying an 
important historical blight on our cities.     
